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I. INTRODUCTION
Economic considerations dominate the analysis of patent law.1 The
most often used theory for the justification of the patent system is the
“incentive to invent” theory, which focuses on the role of patents in
providing adequate economic incentives to invest in technological

∗ Faculty of Law, Ono Academic College. LL.B., 1997, The Hebrew Univ. of Jerusalem; LL.M.,
1999, Columbia Univ.; LL.D., 2009, The Hebrew Univ. of Jerusalem. The author expresses his
gratitude to Leah Chan Grinvald, Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir, James Alexander McElroy Marks and
Michal Shur-Ofry, for their helpful comments and suggestions.
1. See generally A. Samuel Oddi, Un-Unified Economic Theories of Patents—The NotQuite-Holy Grail, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 267 (1996) (surveying many of the economic
justifications for the patent system offered over the years).
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research and development.2 Pursuant to this theory, absent exclusive
legal rights to use an invention, there would be no incentive to invent, as
free riders may imitate the invention and drive down its market price to a
level that would not allow the inventor to recoup her research and
development costs and make a reasonable profit.3 By providing legal
exclusivity, patents overcome this market failure and provide the
missing incentive to engage in inventive activity, thus benefiting society.
The “incentive to invent” theory has been complemented by other
theories, including the “incentive to disclose” theory4 and the “prospect”
theory,5 all of which set out to justify the need for a patent system from
an economic point of view.6
The economic justifications for the patent system have not gone
unchallenged. Over the years, the various purported economic benefits
of the patent system have been called into question. A central argument
criticizing the “incentive to invent” theory has been that government
intervention is not necessary to secure incentives to invent. As the
argument goes, inventions are developed, with or without patents, when

2. See generally Kenneth W. Dam, The Economic Underpinnings of Patent Law, 23 J.
LEGAL STUD. 247, 247 (1994); Wendy J. Gordon, Intellectual Property, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF LEGAL STUDIES 617, 632 (Peter Cane & Mark Tushnet eds., 2003), available at
http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=413001; Yusing Ko, An Economic Analysis of Biotechnology Patent
Protection, 102 YALE L.J. 777, 791-92 (1992). It should be noted that incentives (to create) play a
very significant role in the analysis of copyright law as well. See generally Christina Bohannan,
Copyright Harm, Foreseeability, and Fair Use, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 969, 969 (2007);
Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Foreseeability and Copyright Incentives, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1569, 1577
(2009). In fact, the incentive-based justification for patent law and for copyright law has roots in
the U.S. Constitution, which empowers Congress to “promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Rights to their respective
Writings and Discoveries”. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
3. See infra note 21 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 25-27 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 28-29 and accompanying text.
6. For additional economic theories, see, for example, F. Scott Kieff, Property Rights and
Property Rules for Commercializing Inventions, 85 MINN. L. REV. 697 (2001) (suggesting
justification to the patent system, which is based on the need to provide “incentive to
commercialize” the invention); Gordon, supra note 2, at 632 (listing various theoretical
justifications for the patent system, including the “incentive to design around” theory); Clarisa
Long, Patent Signals, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 625 (2002) (formulating the “signaling” theory, which
focuses on the role played by patents in spreading information about the firms holding them);
Gideon Parchomovsky & R. Polk Wagner, Patent Portfolios, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (2005)
(presenting the “patent portfolio” theory, pursuant to which the true value of patents does not lie in
their individual worth but in their aggregation into a patent portfolio); and Paul J. Heald, A
Transaction Costs Theory of Patent Law, 66 OHIO ST. L.J. 473 (2005) (suggesting a “transaction
costs” theory, which focuses on the function performed by the patent system in reducing transaction
costs compared to the available alternative system for protection, i.e., trade secrecy).
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the state of the art and other relevant circumstances allow for it.7 There
is, in fact, no conclusive empirical evidence establishing that patents are
necessary to incentivize innovation.8
Even if the benefits of the patent system were unquestioned, they
must be balanced against the costs associated with the patent system,
which include, most significantly, the deadweight loss resulting from
non-competitive pricing of patented inventions.9 Scholars analyzing
patent law within an economic framework typically seek out a design of
the relevant legal rules that will maximize the benefits while minimizing
the costs of the patent system. This type of cost-benefit analysis,
naturally, does not always lead to conclusive recommendations. Indeed,
in some cases, such analysis may lead to a dead end.10 Measuring the
costs and benefits associated with each existing or suggested legal rule
affecting the patent system has proven to be particularly challenging.11
Ultimately, it has been impossible to definitively determine whether
current patent law, in the United States or elsewhere, reflects an optimal
balancing of the multiple considerations at stake.12
Yet, economic rationales are not the only possible justifications for
the patent system. The labor theory, pursuant to which every person has
a right to the fruits of her labor,13 and the personality theory, which
focuses on the function of private property as a means for developing
and realizing one’s personality,14 offer alternative justifications. Unlike
the economic approach, which justifies individual rights by pointing at
the benefits to society associated with their existence, the labor and
7. See, e.g., Ko, supra note 2, at 792. For a recent empirical study showing that the
“orthodox” assumption that patents spur technological innovation is not necessarily true, see
Andrew W. Torrance & Bill Tomlinson, Patents and the Regress of Useful Arts, 10 COLUM. SCI. &
TECH. L. REV. 130, 166-67 (2009).
8. See STAFF OF S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 85TH CONG., AN ECONOMIC REVIEW OF THE
PATENT SYSTEM, STUDY OF THE SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHTS, STUDY
NO. 15, at 80 (Comm. Print 1958) (written by Fritz Machlup) (stating that “[i]f we did not have a
patent system, it would be irresponsible, on the basis of our present knowledge of its economic
consequences, to recommend instituting one. But since we have had a patent system for a long
time, it would be irresponsible, on the basis of our present knowledge, to recommend abolishing
it”); see also John H. Barton, Patents and Antitrust: A Rethinking in Light of Patent Breadth and
Sequential Innovation, 65 ANTITRUST L.J. 449, 453 (1996).
9. See generally infra notes 30-32 and accompanying text.
10. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science: Exclusive Rights and
Experimental Use, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1017, 1031 (1989) (noting that the incentive theories are
“analytical dead ends for those seeking to fine tune the patent laws”).
11. See infra note 37 and accompanying text.
12. See, e.g., Eisenberg, supra note 10, at 1031-32 (noting the difficulty in determining
whether the current level of incentives supplied by the patent system is too high or too low).
13. See infra Part III.
14. See infra Part IV.
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personality theories view the interests of individuals in property as
interests worthy of protection in themselves and not just as a means to
the end of promoting the general welfare.15 While these theories are
more commonly used in the analysis of property law or copyright law,
they are not often relied upon in the context of patent law, where the
analysis has been predominately governed by economic considerations.
The potential applicability of these theories to rights in technological
inventions has, in fact, been examined by certain scholars.16 However,
the scholarly treatment of such theories has typically remained on a
general philosophical level, while the actual use of non-utilitarian
considerations to supplement economic theory in the analysis of current
patent law cases and policy problems is not common.17 This Article
challenges this one-dimensional approach and calls for a more frequent
use of non-utilitarian considerations in discussions of the patent system.
To be sure, this Article does not call for the complete abolition of
economic analysis of patent law, which, despite its shortcomings,
remains the most important tool in the evaluation of legal rules in this
arena, where the vast majority of the players are motivated primarily by
economic considerations.18 However, it does call for a broader use of
non-economic considerations, particularly those embedded in the labor
theory and the personality theory, alongside the economic analysis. As
will be shown in detail below, these non-utilitarian justifications for
property rights are, to a great extent, applicable to rights in inventions.
When a person develops a technological product, she invests her labor in
the process and, according to the labor theory, she is therefore entitled to
rights over the invention, subject to certain conditions that will be
discussed below. At the same time, an invention often reflects the
personality of its inventor, and thus, patents may be justified under the
personality theory as well. This Article argues that an examination of
patent law under the framework of these non-utilitarian theories may
offer significant guidance for policymakers in certain instances where
the economic analysis does not point to a definitive solution.
Furthermore, according such theories greater weight in the analysis of
patent law may ultimately result in a patent system that not only serves

15. See infra text accompanying note 62-63 (with respect to the labor theory) and notes 15153 (with respect to the personality theory).
16. See infra note 88 (with respect to the labor theory) and note 166 (with respect to the
personality theory).
17. See also infra text following note 93.
18. In fact, as mentioned before, the economic role of intellectual property law has a
constitutional basis. See supra note 2.
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its prescribed economic goals, but also promotes other important goals,
such as providing just reward for labor and enabling individuals to
develop their personality.
As a case in point, cumulative innovation will be used in this
Article to highlight the ways in which the non-utilitarian theories
referenced above can assist policymakers in areas where the economic
analysis of patent law cannot provide conclusive answers. The term
“cumulative innovation” refers to situations where an inventor uses a
previously patented invention in order to develop her own invention.
This setting poses a special challenge in the design of patent law, as the
interests of more than one inventor must be given due consideration.
While cumulative innovation is far from a new phenomenon,19
policymakers in the patent field are still in disagreement as to the proper
way to approach it. The economic analysis of patent law, in particular,
does not definitively resolve many of the issues raised in this setting.
Cumulative innovation has not been analyzed from any perspective other
than the economic one. This Article will show how the analysis under
the labor and personality theories can add weight to certain conclusions
arising out of the economic analysis, can lend support to an argument or
a counter-argument in matters that are unresolved under the economic
analysis, and in some contexts, shed light on important issues that do not
arise under the economic analysis yet warrant the attention of
policymakers. For example, one of the novel conclusions of the analysis
under the personality theory is that inventors should be granted a right of
attribution in connection with follow-on inventions.
The Article proceeds as follows: Part II provides the necessary
background with respect to the economic analysis of patent law in
general and the economic analysis of cumulative innovation in
particular.20 Part II also highlights the shortcomings of such analyses.
Parts III and IV present the theories at the center of this Article—the
labor theory and the personality theory, respectively—and analyze the
case of cumulative innovation in light of each of these theories. Part V
concludes with a summary and specific recommendations, including
proposals to adopt a wide experimental use exception, to include the

19. As early as 1675, Sir Isaac Newton noted: “If I have seen further it is only by standing on
the shoulders of giants.” Suzanne Scotchmer, Standing on the Shoulders of Giants: Cumulative
Research and the Patent Law, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 29, 29 (Winter 1991) (quoting Letter from Isaac
Newton to Robert Hooke (Feb. 5, 1675)).
20. See generally Ofer Tur-Sinai, Cumulative Innovation in Patent Law: Making Sense of
Incentives, 50 IDEA 723 (2010) (analyzing cumulative innovation from the point of view of the
“incentive to invent” theory).
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exploitation of follow-on inventions within the scope of the original
patent, and to apply liability rules in case the inventors fail to reach a
voluntary agreement allowing such exploitation.
II. BACKGROUND: ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF PATENT LAW
A.

General

As mentioned above, the traditional analysis of patent law focuses
on the economic benefits of the patent system. The most common
justification for the patent system is the “incentive to invent” theory,
according to which in a world without patents, inventors would lack an
economic incentive to invest in research and development. This is so
because of the “public good” characteristics of an invention: nonexcludability (once competitors of the inventor have found out about an
invention, it is difficult to prevent them from using it without paying)
and non-rivalry (the use of the invention by one does not prevent
simultaneous use by others).21 Thus, despite the potentially high social
value of an invention, an inventor may lack adequate incentive to
develop it, absent some type of protection against competition from free
riders. Patent law provides such protection by granting the inventor
exclusive rights to her invention for a limited period of time, during
which she should be able to cover her research and development costs
and make a reasonable profit in the market for her invention.
Over the years, the “incentive to invent” theory has been the subject
of a variety of challenges. One line of criticism is that state intervention
is not really necessary to secure an incentive to invent. Not all inventors
are driven by economic motives.22 Even those who invent for purely

21. The combination of these characteristics creates the potential for sub-investment in the
production of public goods in general and inventions in particular. See generally Daphna
Lewinsohn-Zamir, Consumer Preferences, Citizen Preferences, and the Provision of Public Goods,
108 YALE L.J. 377 (1998) (discussing the provision of public goods). For the public goods nature
of inventions, see, for example, Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89
VA. L. REV. 1575, 1580 (2003).
22. Alternative motives to invent may be the prospect of gaining professional reputation and
fame amongst colleagues or sheer intellectual curiosity. See Tur-Sinai, supra note 20, at 738; see
also Gordon, supra note 2, at 632 (noting that the existence of reputational advantages might reduce
the need for a patent system). Cf., e.g., Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Copyrights as Incentives: Did
We Just Imagine That?, THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN LAW (forthcoming), available at
http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=1515964 (challenging the traditional incentive justification for
copyright law, while drawing on behavioral studies that suggest that intrinsic factors are much more
important determinants of participation in creative work than such extrinsic ones as monetary
reward); Rebecca Tushnet, Economies of Desire: Fair Use and Marketplace Assumptions, 51 WM.
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economic reasons can be protected from competition by the existence of
high production and imitation costs, which may deter free riders, or can
at least be allowed to enjoy a head start in the market until such free
riders reveal the workings of the invention.23 This criticism cannot serve
to completely negate justification for the patent system, as studies show
that at least in some industries inventors do rely on patents to supply an
incentive.24 However, it certainly calls into question the ability to base
the entire justification for the patent system, with its broad application to
a vast array of technological fields, solely on the “incentive to invent”
theory.
Two other theories of note which suggest economic justifications
for the patent system are the “incentive to disclose” theory and the
“prospect” theory. The incentive to disclose theory focuses on the role
that patents purportedly play in promoting disclosure of the information
underlying a new invention by its inventor.25 The main criticism of this
theory is that in many cases, an invention’s working cannot be kept
secret once it has been commercialized.26 In the few cases where
secrecy is feasible, the inventor would typically avoid registering a
patent for her invention because she would rather keep it secret to enjoy
trade secret protection, which may last for an indefinite period of time.27
The prospect theory, formulated by Kitch, posits that the main
justification for the patent system is that it increases the efficiency in
allocation of resources for technological development by granting
ownership to the inventor in the technological prospect derived from her
& MARY L. REV. 513 (2009) (exploring the ways in which the desire to create can be free from the
need for economic incentive).
23. See, e.g., Eisenberg, supra note 10, at 1026; Ko, supra note 2, at 794.
24. For recent empirical evidence of the role that patents play in the biotechnology industry,
see Stuart J.H. Graham et al., High Technology Entrepreneurs and the Patent System: Results of the
2008 Berkeley Patent Survey, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 4 (2009). As to the importance of patents in
the pharmaceutical industry, see, for example, Benjamin N. Roin, Unpatentable Drugs and the
Standards of Patentability, 87 TEX. L. REV. 503, 569 (2009). For studies comparing the value of
patents in different industries, see, for example, John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Who’s
Patenting What? An Empirical Exploration of Patent Prosecution, 53 VAND. L. REV. 2099, 2125
(2000) (suggesting a possibility that patents are considered more important in the chemical,
pharmaceutical and biotechnological fields than in other fields); John R. Allison et al., Valuable
Patents, 92 GEO. L.J. 435, 471-76 (2004) (discussing differences in patent litigation patterns
between various industries and concluding that patents in some industries are more likely to be
valuable than patents in other industries).
25. See generally Gordon, supra note 2, at 632; Eisenberg, supra note 10, at 1028-29; Julie S.
Turner, The Nonmanufacturing Patent Owner: Toward a Theory of Efficient Infringement, 86 CAL.
L. REV. 179, 189-90 (1998).
26. See Eisenberg, supra note 10, at 1028-29.
27. James Bessen & Eric Maskin, Sequential Innovation, Patents, and Imitation, 40 RAND J.
ECON. 611, 620 n.31 (2009), available at http://www.researchoninnovation.org/patrev.pdf.
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invention.28 This theory has never gained wide support amongst
scholars analyzing the patent system and it has been the subject of
criticism, doubting particularly the ability and motivation of an inventor
to engage in further development of the prospect derived from her
original invention.29
Alongside the purported benefits of patents outlined above,
economic discussion of patent law has also highlighted certain costs
associated with the patent system, including the deadweight loss
resulting from non-competitive pricing of the patented invention,30 the
waste caused by the rent-seeking behavior of inventors engaging in a
race to the patent office, 31 and the potential chilling effect of patents on
follow-on research, which is manifested in the cumulative innovation
setting.32 Any attempt to design patent law based on economic theory
must confront the trade-off between the desire to maximize incentives—
to invent, disclose, or develop the “prospect”—and the need to minimize
costs.33 For example, it could be suggested that in order to supply
incentives in the maximum amount of cases, the exclusivity period
provided by patents should be indefinite.34 Yet, this solution also
maximizes patent costs. The larger the economic reward, the more
28. Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265
(1977).
29. See, e.g., Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent
Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839, 871-79 (1990); John F. Duffy, Rethinking the Prospect Theory of
Patents, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 439 (2004) (critically examining the “prospect” theory).
30. See, e.g., Dam, supra note 2, at 249-51; Kitch, supra note 28, at 266-67; Merges &
Nelson, supra note 29, at 871; Richard R. Nelson, Intellectual Property Protection for Cumulative
Systems Technology, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2674, 2676 (1994).
31. See, e.g., Michelle Armond, Introducing the Defense of Independent Invention to Motions
for Preliminary Injunctions in Patent Infringement Lawsuits, 91 CAL. L. REV. 117, 142-43 (2003);
Dam, supra note 2, at 251-52; Mark F. Grady & Jay I. Alexander, Patent Law and Rent Dissipation,
78 VA. L. REV. 305, 308 (1992).
32. For a more comprehensive list of costs, see Tur-Sinai, supra note 20, at 737.
33. See WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, INVENTION, GROWTH AND WELFARE: A THEORETICAL
TREATMENT OF TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE (1969), for one of the most influential studies of the
patent system, which discusses the basic trade-off between the desire to provide an incentive to
invent and the social loss resulting from the monopolistic pricing by the patent owner, in an attempt
to figure out optimal patent length. This article has served as the basis for many other studies of the
patent system focusing on the above-mentioned trade-off. See, e.g., Richard Gilbert & Carl
Shapiro, Optimum Patent Length and Breadth, 21 RAND J. ECON. 106 (1990); Paul Klemperer, How
Broad Should the Scope of Patent Protection Be?, 21 RAND J. ECON. 113 (1990) (attempting to find
the combination of patent length and patent scope that would ensure a given amount of profit to the
inventor while minimizing monopolistic cost).
34. Cf. Scotchmer, supra note 19, at 31 (arguing that “the only way to ensure that firms
undertake every research project that is efficient is to let the firms collect as revenue all the social
value they create”). But see Gordon, supra note 2, at 622 (claiming that “no one would suggest that
IP should internalize all the benefits that flow from an intangible”).
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inventions will supposedly be developed, but the costs associated with
patents will also increase unnecessarily with respect to inventions that
would have been developed otherwise.35
Reaching definitive conclusions regarding the optimal design of
patent law based on economic analysis is, thus, a difficult task.36 What
complicates things even further is that the current level of incentives
created by the patent system, as well as the effect of any suggested
change in the laws on such incentives and on the costs associated with
the system, is very difficult to measure, as policymakers lack accurate
information with respect to the relevant parameters, such as the research
and development costs associated with the development of various
inventions.37 The fact that the patent system, with its “one-size-fits-all”
approach, applies to various technological fields, which broadly differ
from one another with respect to various relevant parameters,
complicates things even further.38 To be sure, even if economic analysis
could be used to clearly point out the direction that needs to be taken by
policymakers—increasing or decreasing the strength of patents—it
generally offers no guidance “in evaluating the relevant merits of
different packages of patent rights” that may achieve such an overall
effect.39 For all these reasons, it is not possible to reach accurate
recommendations with respect to the optimal design of patent law based
on economic analysis alone.
B.

Economic Analysis of Cumulative Innovation

As explained above, the term “cumulative innovation” refers to
situations where an inventor uses a previously patented invention in the
development process of her own invention.40 Cumulative innovation
cases can be roughly classified into a few categories, including, most

35. See, e.g., SUZANNE SCOTCHMER, INNOVATION AND INCENTIVES 98 (2006); Gordon, supra
note 2, at 632; Scotchmer, supra note 19, at 31.
36. Cf. Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Analyze This: A Law and Economics Agenda for the Patent
System, 53 VAND. L. REV. 2081, 2081-82 (2000) (noting the “indeterminacy of economic analysis
in evaluating the patent system”).
37. Surely, policymakers cannot rely in this respect on information submitted by the
inventors. See Tur-Sinai, supra note 20, at 740 n.66. See generally Eisenberg, supra note 10, at
1030-31 (pointing out that the economic theories do not supply an answer to the empirical question
of how much incentive is necessary).
38. See generally Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Is Patent Law Technology-Specific?, 17
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1155, 1155 (2002) (describing the one-size-fits-all nature of the patent
system).
39. See Eisenberg, supra note 10, at 1030-31.
40. See Tur-Sinai, supra note 20, at 731.
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importantly,41 (1) the basic technology-applications category,42 (2) the
43
44
In all
improvements category, and (3) the research tools category.
these situations, there is concern that the patent for the first invention
will delay or even prohibit the activity of the second inventor. This is
not just a theoretical concern and there are numerous examples—from
the early days of the radio industry to modern day—of cases in which a
patent had a chilling effect on follow-on research and development in
the relevant field.45
The economic analysis of patent law has traditionally focused on
the process leading to the development of an isolated invention and on
the costs associated with the grant of exclusive rights in such invention,
while ignoring the possibility that an invention can also serve as an input
in the development process of follow-on inventions.46 Cumulative
innovation places an additional burden on the patent system as the
interests of more than one inventor must be taken into account and
weighed against each other.47 From the perspective of the “incentive to
invent” theory, the challenge is to design patent law in a manner
ensuring a division of profits between the inventors that allows each one
to cover her costs and make a sufficient profit.48 Policymakers are thus

41. The following list is not exhaustive. For a more comprehensive list of scenarios, see id. at
731-32. See also SCOTCHMER, supra note 35, at 132 (2006); Oren Bar-Gill & Gideon
Parchomovsky, The Value of Giving Away Secrets, 89 VA. L. REV. 1857, 1868 (2003).
42. In this scenario, the patented invention is a basic technology—such as laser technology—
which forms the basis for a variety of applications in multiple technological fields. For additional
examples, see Tur-Sinai, supra note 20, 731 n.22.
43. In this category, the follow-on invention is an improvement of the patented invention.
Improvements are common in many industries. For various examples, see id. at 731 n.23.
44. In this scenario, the patented invention serves as a research tool in the development
process of the follow-on invention, though ultimately, it is not embedded in it. There are many
patented inventions whose sole purpose is to serve as a research tool. For various examples from
the biotechnology and nanotechnology fields, see id. at 732.
45. Id. at 732-33. For a thorough study of the history of science in this respect, see Merges &
Nelson, supra note 29, at 884-908.
46. See, e.g., Merges & Nelson, supra note 29, at 868 (claiming that in most discussions of
the patent system, emphasis is placed on the basic trade-off between incentives to the inventor and
sub-use of her invention as a result of monopolistic rights granted to her); Nelson, supra note 30, at
2676 (arguing that the problems associated with the grant of strong patent rights in cumulative
technologies are not adequately dealt with in the standard isolated invention model).
47. Cf. Scotchmer, supra note 19, at 30 (“The challenge is to reward early innovators fully for
the technological foundation they provide to later innovators, but to reward later innovators
adequately for their improvements and new products as well”).
48. Cf. SCOTCHMER, supra note 35, at 135; Suzanne Scotchmer, Protecting Early Innovators:
Should Second-Generation Products Be Patentable?, 27 RAND J. ECON. 322, 322 (1996) (“The
possible division of R&D effort among many firms places an additional burden on the patent
system. Not only must it try to ensure that research firms earn enough profit in total to cover the
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confronted with a new trade-off on top of the basic trade-off between
49
incentives and costs. The more we strengthen the rights of the original
inventor in order to increase her incentive to invent—i.e., by increasing
her control over the development and use of follow-on inventions—the
more we hurt the incentives of others to develop follow-on inventions.
Yet, the more we strengthen the rights of follow-on inventors—i.e., by
broadening their freedom to develop and commercialize their
inventions—the more we hurt the incentive of the original inventor.
Confronted with such a complicated challenge and considering the
general shortcomings of the economic analysis described above, it is not
surprising that scholars and policymakers in the patent arena are still in
disagreement as to the proper means to deal with cumulative innovation.
Admittedly, there are certain principles which are widely agreed
upon by scholars dealing with cumulative innovation. First, it is agreed
by most scholars that at least a certain degree of freedom to engage in
cumulative research and development must be ensured.50 Second, it is
generally assumed that a follow-on inventor who has managed to
develop an invention that meets the general criteria for patent eligibility
should be able to register a patent for it.51 Third, it is generally
acknowledged that the original patentee has to be compensated
52
somehow for the use of her invention.

total costs of R&D, but in addition the profit must be divided among them such that each firm
covers its costs”).
49. For a presentation of the matter as a trade-off, see for example ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH
LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS: HOW OUR BROKEN PATENT SYSTEM IS
ENDANGERING INNOVATION AND PROGRESS, AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 48–49 (2004); Dam,
supra note 2, at 253, 266-67; Howard F. Chang, Patent Scope, Antitrust Policy, and Cumulative
Innovation, 26 RAND J. ECON. 34, 35 (1995).
50. See, e.g., Eisenberg, supra note 10, at 1078; Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Proprietary Rights
and the Norms of Science in Biotechnology Research, 97 YALE L.J. 177, 224-26 (1987); Irving N.
Feit, Biotechnology Research and the Experimental Use Exception to Patent Infringement, 71 J.
PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 819, 839-41 (1989); Janice M. Mueller, No “Dilettante Affair”:
Rethinking the Experimental Use Exception to Patent Infringement for Biomedical Research Tools,
76 WASH. L. REV. 1, 66 (2001); Tom Saunders, Case Comment, Renting Space on the Shoulders of
Giants: Madey and the Future of the Experimental Use Doctrine, 113 YALE L.J. 261, 268 (2003);
Katherine J. Strandburg, What Does the Public Get?: Experimental Use and the Patent Bargain,
2004 WIS. L. REV. 81, 119-52 (2004); Wendy Thai, Toward Facilitating Access to Patented
Research Tools, 6 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. 373, 390-97 (2004). But see Jordan P. Karp,
Experimental Use as Patent Infringement: The Impropriety of a Broad Exception, 100 YALE L.J.
2169, 2188 (1991) (arguing against a broad experimental use exception).
51. This is, in fact, so widely agreed upon, that there are hardly any discussions in the
literature with respect to this matter. For an exception, see Scotchmer, supra note 48.
52. See, e.g., Eisenberg, supra note 10, at 1077-78; Donna M. Gitter, International Conflicts
over Patenting Human DNA Sequences in the United States and the European Union: An Argument
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However, there are many questions related to the matter that do not
enjoy consensus among scholars, and economic theory does not provide
definitive answers to these questions. Some of these questions are
fundamental in nature. For example, there is no consensus among
scholars as to the principal question of which regime—one that allows
for competition in the market for follow-on inventions or one that places
exclusive control of the technological prospect derived from the original
invention at the hands of its inventor—is a more efficient environment
for technology development.53 Another key matter which is disputed
among scholars is the extent to which it is reasonable to expect inventors
in a cumulative innovation setting to come to a voluntary agreement
allowing for the development and/or commercialization of a follow-on
invention while dividing the profits in a manner preserving their
respective incentives to invent.54 The lack of conclusive evidence on

for Compulsory Licensing and a Fair-Use Exemption, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1623, 1679, 1683 (2001);
Mueller, supra note 50, at 9-10.
53. Compare Kitch, supra note 28 (supporting a wide patent to the original patentee, granting
her control over the prospect derived from her invention), with Merges & Nelson, supra note 29
(arguing that the grant of exclusive control of the prospect to the original patentee may actually
stifle technological development in the field). See also Tur-Sinai, supra note 20, at 734-35
(pointing out that the original inventor may not always possess the requisite incentive and ability to
develop follow-on inventions, and hence, competition must be allowed).
54. Many scholars have expressed pessimism as to the efficiency of the market for licenses,
while pointing at the particularly high transaction costs and other factors that make it difficult for
the parties to come to an agreement in this setting. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of
Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 75 TEX. L. REV. 989, 1052-65 (1997); Merges & Nelson,
supra note 29, at 874-75; Maureen A. O’Rourke, Toward a Doctrine of Fair Use in Patent Law, 100
COLUM. L. REV. 1177, 1179 (2000); see also Jay Dratler, Jr., Invention is a Process, or Why the
Electronics and Pharmaceutical Industries are at Loggerheads over Patents 26 (U. of Akron Legal
Studies Research, Paper No. 06-13, July 2006), available at http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=899924;
Jay Dratler, Jr., Combinatorial Mathematics and the Problem of Early-Stage Patents in
Biotechnology 1 (U. of Akron Legal Studies Research, Paper No. 07-02, Jan. 2007), available at
http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=959462; Jay Dratler, Jr., Fixing Our Broken Patent System, 14
MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 47, 56 (2010) (noting the high transaction costs associated with the
need to secure consent of early stage patentees for a follow-on project, which rise significantly as
the number of such early patents increases). However, certain recent empirical studies suggest that
these concerns may be more theoretical than practical. See, e.g., John P. Walsh et al., Effects of
Research Tool Patents and Licensing on Biomedical Innovation, in PATENTS IN THE KNOWLEDGEBASED ECONOMY 285 (Wesley M. Cohen & Stephen A. Merrill eds., 2003) (providing survey
results indicating that the patenting of research tools in the biomedical industry has generally not
been viewed as having a substantial negative effect on further research in the field). The main
explanation for the results supplied in Walsh’s study is that firms and universities have been able to
develop “working solutions” that allow their research to proceed, including the emergence of a
licensing practice. Id. at 286. The authors state their opinion that “it is typically not that difficult to
contract” and state that licensing is routine in the drug industry. Id. at 322.
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such fundamental matters underlies some of the disagreements among
scholars as to the proper way to design patent law in this context.55
Alongside such principal matters, there are also many unresolved
questions that relate to the finer details of the optimal legal regime.56
For example, even among scholars who are in support of a relatively
wide experimental use exception in patent law, which allows for certain
experimental uses of the invention to take place during the patent period
without the patentee’s advance permission, there is no agreement as to
whether and how such an exception should be qualified to distinguish
between permissible and non-permissible activities.57
Another
unresolved matter is the appropriate manner for compensating the

55. For a “battle” of scholars that seems to stem from the basic disagreement on the efficiency
level of the market for licenses, see for example Arti Kaur Rai, Regulating Scientific Research:
Intellectual Property Rights and the Norms of Science, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 77 (1999); F. Scott Kieff,
Facilitating Scientific Research: Intellectual Property Rights and the Norms of Science—A
Response to Rai and Eisenberg, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 691 (2001); Arti Kaur Rai, Evolving Scientific
Norms and Intellectual Property Rights: A Reply to Kieff, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 707 (2001). Whereas
Rai argues that in light of high transaction costs, property protection for upstream research results
should be weakened, Kieff supports the patenting of basic research while relying on the ability of
the market to ensure efficient utilization of the patented inventions.
56. The following list of unresolved questions is not meant to be exhaustive.
57. One suggestion that has been made in the literature is to make a distinction based on
whether the research user is motivated by profit or not. See, e.g., Richard E. Bee, Experimental Use
as an Act of Patent Infringement, 39 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 357, 377 (1957); cf. Gitter, supra note 52,
at 1628, 1679 (suggesting that different rules are to be applied with respect to commercially driven
research and other research). This is, in fact, the position taken by the U.S. judiciary. See, e.g.,
Embrex, Inc. v. Serv. Eng’g Corp., 216 F.3d 1343, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (stating the narrow
construction of the experimental use exception); Roche Prods., Inc. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., 733 F.2d
858, 863 (Fed. Cir. 1984), superseded by statute 35 U.S.C. § 271(e) (1994) (holding the
experimental use exception to be truly narrow and not applicable when the allegedly infringing use
has “definite, cognizable, and not insubstantial commercial purposes”); Ares-Serono, Inc. v.
Organon Int’l B.V., 862 F. Supp. 603, 608 (Mass. Dist. Ct. 1994) (clarifying that “[t]he
experimental use exception does not protect experiments or tests which have a commercial
purpose”); Pfizer, Inc. v. Int’l Rectifier Corp., No. 73-58, 1982 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17411, at *12
(C.D. Cal. July 20, 1982) (holding that experimental use “cannot be invoked for the protection of
one who uses a patented invention commercially”). For criticism of this position, see, for example,
Eisenberg, supra note 10, at 1023-24, 1035. Another distinction suggested in the literature is
between research users who compete with the patent owner in the same market and research users
who are “regular consumers” of the invention, as in the research tools scenario. See, e.g.,
Eisenberg, supra note 10, at 1074-78; Eisenberg, supra note 50, at 225; DAVID GILAT, II STUDIES,
EXPERIMENTAL USE AND PATENTS 44 (1995); Ronald D. Hantman, Experimental Use as an
Exception to Patent Infringement, 67 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 617, 638-41 (1985). Yet,
this suggestion as well has not been unanimously agreed to by scholars attending to the matter. See,
e.g., Gitter, supra note 52, at 1684-85 (proposing the application of the experimental use exception
with respect to noncommercial research in DNA sequences); Thai, supra note 50, at 393-97
(suggesting the exemption of certain uses of research tools in university research); Tur-Sinai, supra
note 20, at 756-57 (supporting a broad application of the experimental use exception with respect to
research tools).
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original inventor for the use of her invention. Should such compensation
be limited to cases where a successful follow-on invention was
developed and be based on the actual level of market profits, or should
compensation be given for the mere use of the original invention even
where such use did not result in the successful development of a followon invention?58 Should there be cases where a complete exemption—
i.e., an exception covering the commercialization stage, and not only the
development stage—is granted to the follow-on inventor, and what
should be the grounds for such exemption?59 In cases that do not fall
under such exemption, should the consent of the original patentee for the
commercialization of a follow-on invention always be required, or is it
more efficient to apply liability rule doctrines in this context, at least
under certain circumstances, allowing the follow-on inventor to exploit
her invention even without permission in return for an appropriate
royalty to be determined by the United States Patent and Trademark
Office or by the courts?60 How should such royalty be calculated?61

58. Compare Mueller, supra note 50, at 62 (supporting compensation even when the research
use does not result in a commercial product), with Tur-Sinai, supra note 20, at 756 (justifying a
regime where compensation is not given for the mere research use of the original invention).
59. For support of such an exemption doctrine, see, for example, Chang, supra note 49, at 4249 (arguing that fewer exemptions should be granted when the standalone value of the original
invention is particularly low or particularly high); Merges & Nelson, supra note 29, at 865-67
(arguing that an exemption is warranted particularly when the marginal value of the second
invention is higher than the standalone value of the original invention). But see Tur-Sinai, supra
note 20, at 759-60 (arguing that, in light of the potential damage to the original inventor’s incentive
as a result of such exemption doctrine, its application should be primarily restricted to cases where
the original inventor could not have reasonably expected the development of the follow-on
invention). For a limited exemption doctrine adopted by the U.S. judiciary—the so-called “reverse
doctrine of equivalents”—see Tur-Sinai, supra note 20, at 770.
60. For a suggestion to apply liability rules in a sweeping manner whenever negotiations
between the inventors fail, see Tur-Sinai, supra note 20, at 761. In practice, even countries that
have enacted a liability rule in this context in the form of a compulsory license have conditioned it
upon the follow-on invention involving “an important technical advance of considerable economic
significance in relation to the invention claimed in the first patent.” Richard T. Jackson, A Lockean
Approach to the Compulsory Patent Licensing Controversy, 9 J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 117, 120 (2004).
This limitation originated in the Marrakesh Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization,
Annex 1C, Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights art. 31(l)(i), Apr.
15, 1994, 33 I.L.M 1210 (1994) [hereinafter “the TRIPS Agreement”], which sets up mandatory
conditions in this regard. It should be noted that in the United States, which is known for its general
hostility towards compulsory licenses in patent law, no such provision has been enacted. See TurSinai, supra note 20, at 773.
61. For relevant discussions in the literature, see for example Jerome H. Reichman, Of Green
Tulips and Legal Kudzu: Repackaging Rights in Subpatentable Innovation, in EXPANDING THE
BOUNDARIES OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: INNOVATION POLICY FOR THE KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY
23, 44 (Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss et al. eds., 2001); Mueller, supra note 50, at 64-65; Tur-Sinai,
supra note 20, at 765-66.
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Against this background, this Article will now turn to examine the
potential contribution of integrating non-utilitarian theories into the
analysis of patent law, in general, and in connection with the search for
an optimal solution to the perplexing case of cumulative innovation, in
particular.
III. THE LABOR THEORY
A.

General

One of the principal theories used in support of property rights is
the labor theory, based on the work of John Locke, who argued that
every person has a right to the fruits of her labor.62 This is a theory of
natural law, which views property rights as pre-existing in the state of
63
64
nature. According to Locke, God gave the world to men in common,
yet “every man has a property [right] in his own person”65 and from
such right follows also his right to “[t]he Labour of his Body, and the
66
Work of his Hands.” Therefore, whatever a person has removed out of
its natural state and mixed her labor therewith belongs to her.67 One
fundamental condition to the acquisition of property, according to the
labor theory, is that the resources that labor is mixed with have been
initially in the “common state,” i.e., in the public domain.68 Beyond
that, Locke described two main limitations to the scope of property
69
rights that a person may acquire in the fruits of her labor : (1) “there is

62. JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 290-91 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge
Univ. Press 1988) (1690).
63. See, e.g., JEREMY WALDRON, THE RIGHT TO PRIVATE PROPERTY 19 (Brotherhood eds.,
Jerusalem 1988); Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir, Compensation for Injuries to Land Caused by
Planning Authorities: Towards a Comprehensive Theory, 46 U. TORONTO L.J. 47, 50 (1996).
64. LOCKE, supra note 62, at 286.
65. Id. at 287.
66. Id. at 287-88.
67. Id. at 288.
68. Id. See also Benjamin G. Damstedt, Limiting Locke: A Natural Law Justification for the
Fair Use Doctrine, 112 YALE L.J. 1179, 1181 (2003).
69. In addition to these two limitations, it can be argued that the acquisition of property
should also be limited by the general principle of natural law, pursuant to which one should not
cause damage to another, other than in certain instances of extreme necessity. See LOCKE, supra
note 62, at 271 (“no one ought to harm another in his Life, Health, Liberty, or Possessions”).
However, this principle may not be necessary as a separate limitation on the ability to acquire
property as it seems that Locke took it into account while designing the specific rules governing the
acquisition of property. First, the principal rule itself, assigning property rights to the laborer, can
be justified by the no-harm principle, assuming that taking the fruits of her labor away would cause
the laborer harm. See, e.g., Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self Expression: Equality and
Individualism in the Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L.J. 1533, 1544-45, 1561
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enough, and as good left in common for others”;70 and (2) the laborer
does not waste resources by taking more than she needs for her own use,
71
including use by means of exchange with others.
As explained above, Locke’s conclusion that a person has a
property right in the fruits of her labor follows from his argument that a
person owns a right to her own body, hence to the labor of her body, and
therefore to anything that results from mixing her labor with common
resources.72 This may be considered an adequate justification for the
existence of property rights under the theory.73 However, among those
who studied and analyzed Locke’s theory, some consider such
conclusion as warranting a separate justification, which they have looked
for in other places in Locke’s writings or elsewhere.74 One possible
justification for recognizing property rights in the fruits of one’s labor is
that when labor results in something valuable for society then the laborer
is morally entitled to a just reward in consideration for such value.75 It
should be noted that if, indeed, the justification for the laborer’s right is
her contribution to society, then the scope of such right should arguably
be limited to the added value derived from the labor and should not
include the original resource that the labor was invested it.76 Another
(1993); Damstedt, supra note 68, at 1185-86. Second, in order to ensure that no harm is caused to
others as a result of the grant of property right to the laborer, Locke set the two specific limitations
discussed in the text. See, e.g., Gordon, supra, at 1562; Damstedt, supra note 68, at 1185.
70. LOCKE, supra note 62, at 288. This limitation can be interpreted broadly—a requirement
to leave enough resources from the exact same type and quality—but such interpretation may
completely negate the possibility to attain rights in objects, at least when it comes to tangibles.
Therefore, scholars analyzing Locke’s theory tended to interpret this requirement in a narrower
manner, i.e., as a requirement to leave enough resources of any type that would enable others to
work and earn sustenance. See Damstedt, supra note 68, at 1187.
71. LOCKE, supra note 62, at 290 (“[a]s much as any one can make use of any advantage of
life before it spoils; so much he may by his Labour fix a Property in. Whatever is beyond this, is
more than his share, and belongs to others. Nothing was made by God for Man to spoil or
destroy”); id. at 295 (“[b]ut if they perished, in his Possession, without their due use; if the Fruits
rotted, or the Venison putrified, before he could spend it, he offended against the common Law of
Nature, and was liable to be punished; he invaded his Neighbour’s share, for he had no Right,
farther than his Use called for any of them, and they might serve to afford him Conveniencies of
Life”); id. at 300 (discussing the possibility of exchange).
72. For a description of the labor theory along similar lines, see Damstedt, supra note 68, at
1181, 1184.
73. According to this interpretation of the theory, the justification for private property is based
on the property right that a person has in her body, which attaches to the product of her labor.
74. See, e.g., Wendy Lim, Towards Developing a Natural Law Jurisprudence in the U.S.
Patent System, 19 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 561, 579 (2003).
75. See, e.g., Lawrence C. Becker, Deserving to Own Intellectual Property, 68 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 609, 624 (1993); Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 GEO. L.J. 287,
305 (1988). See, with respect to the value of labor, infra note 78.
76. See Hughes, supra note 75, at 305.
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reward-type justification is based on the assumption that human beings
would rather avoid labor and that compensation for the inconvenience of
the laborer should be given to her in the form of a right in the fruits of
her labor.77 The above arguments may also serve as a basis for a
utilitarian interpretation of Locke’s theory. If people’s natural tendency
78
is to avoid labor, then in light of labor’s importance to society, human
beings should be given an incentive to labor, which is what property
79
rights are meant to provide. An alternative justification for granting a
property right to the laborer is that a person needs a means of
sustenance, and as work is the main way of attaining this, there is a need
to recognize a laborer’s right to the means of sustenance she acquired
through work.80 Finally, labor theory can be tied to the general
principles of unjust enrichment, which are based on notions of corrective
justice because absent protection for the right of a person to exclusively
enjoy the fruits of her labor, others may be unjustly enriched at her
expense.81
The labor theory can be criticized on various grounds. One critical
argument that can be made against the theory is that there is a wide gap
between the theory and the real state of affairs as a result of the theory’s
focus on merely one mechanism for attaining private property while
ignoring other mechanisms, such as inheritance. The economic disparity
between individuals in society is wide, and there is not necessarily a
correlation between the amount of work done by each individual and her
level of wealth.82 A different argument notes that a theory based on an

77. Id. at 303.
78. See, with respect to the importance of labor, LOCKE, supra note 62, at 297. Locke notes
that granting property rights to individuals in assets that they created through their labor increases
the pool of assets that stands to serve society. Id. at 294. A possible argument is that if the new
assets created by labor remain the property of the laborer, then society’s wealth does not increase,
though Locke emphasizes that such new assets can potentially serve other members of society
through exchange transactions. Id. at 300. For discussion, see also Hughes, supra note 75, at 299.
79. For an interpretation of the labor theory along similar lines, see, for example, Hughes,
supra note 75, at 296; David W. Opderbeck, Symposium: Closing In on Open Science: Trends in
Intellectual Property & Scientific Research: A Virtue-Centered Approach to the Biotechnology
Commons (or, the Virtuous Penguin), 59 ME. L. REV. 315, 317 (2007).
80. This is implied by Locke himself. See LOCKE, supra note 62, at 288-89; cf. Becker, supra
note 75, at 626-28 (discussing psychological needs of the laborer “that can appropriately be met by
the award of property rights”).
81. See LOCKE, supra note 62, at 291 (“He that had as good left for his Improvement, as was
already taken up, needed not complain, ought not to meddle with what was already improved by
another’s Labour: If he did, ’tis plain he desired the benefit of another’s Pains, which he had no
right to”).
82. See DAPHNA LEWINSOHN-ZAMIR, INJURIES TO LAND CAUSED BY PLANNING
AUTHORITIES 63 (1994) (in Hebrew).
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assumption that labor can be attributed exclusively to a single individual
is unrealistic, as work in modern day is typically done in teams
comprised of numerous individuals in an environment that provides the
laborer with the necessary tools and opportunity to work. This makes it
difficult to justify the grant of exclusive rights in an asset to an
individual based on the argument that such asset is the product of her
labor.83 A related criticism may be that, inasmuch as the labor theory is
based on the argument that the laborer is entitled to a reward for her
contribution to society, the theory cannot justify full property rights in
assets with a value exceeding such contribution. Beyond that, one may
criticize the religious notions underlying the theory, the initial claim that
a person has a property-like right over her body, and the implicit
assumptions that the theory is based upon, such as the assumption that
there is an indefinite amount of resources in the public domain.84
Finally, it can be argued that, even if the laborer deserves to be rewarded
for her work, this does not necessarily mean that such reward should be
in the form of a property right in the fruits of her labor, as it is seemingly
sufficient to award her money damages, at least according to some of the
aforementioned justifications to the theory.85
Ultimately, despite these and other critical arguments, the labor
theory has become over the years one of the main theories for justifying
rights in private property.86 Even though the theory originally focused
87
on property rights in physical assets, it has been used for the
justification and analysis of intellectual property rights as well.88
83. See MORRIS R. COHEN, Property and Sovereignty, in LAW AND THE SOCIAL ORDER 41, 51
(1933) (noting that “economic goods are never the result of any one man’s unaided labour”).
84. If natural resources were limited, then at some point it would become impossible to meet
the theory’s requirement that enough is left for others. Cf. Damstedt, supra note 68, at 1181, 1187
(arguing that if the duty to leave enough to others is interpreted broadly (see supra note 70), the
theory fails). This is exactly the reason why some argue that the theory is more applicable to
intangibles. See infra note 112 and accompanying text.
85. See generally J. W. HARRIS, PROPERTY AND JUSTICE 209 (1996) (noting that “[c]laims to
property based on labour-desert are dependent on social convention”).
86. See, e.g., id. at 182-212; STEPHEN R. MUNZER, A THEORY OF PROPERTY 254-91 (1990);
WALDRON, supra note 63, at 137-252.
87. For an argument that a more thorough examination of Locke’s writings reveals that he
actually had a solid point of view with respect to rights in intangibles as well, see generally Lior
Zemer, The Making of a New Copyright Lockean, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 891 (2006).
88. See, e.g., Becker, supra note 75; Hughes, supra note 75; Damstedt, supra note 68;
Gordon, supra note 69; Zemer, supra note 87; Lim, supra note 74, at 579; Stephen M. McJohn, The
Paradoxes of Free Software, 9 GEO. MASON L. REV. 25, 44 (2000); Caroline Nguyen, Toward an
Incentivized But Just Intellectual Property Practice: The Compensated IP Proposal, 14 CORNELL
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 113, 119-26 (2004); Molly A. Holman & Stephen R. Munzer, Intellectual
Property Rights in Genes and Gene Fragments: A Registration Solution for Expressed Sequence
Tags, 85 IOWA L. REV. 735, 832-35 (2000). See generally Andrew R. Sommer, Trouble on the
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Although there are various challenges associated with applying the
theory to intangibles, it is generally agreed that to the extent that it is
possible to justify property in tangibles based on the labor theory, it is
also possible to use it for the justification of intellectual property
89
90
rights, and in a way, it is even easier to do so. When a person creates
a work of authorship or develops a technological invention, she invests
her labor in the process,91 and therefore, according to the labor theory, is
entitled to rights over the product resulting from such process, provided
only that the conditions for the acquisition of property set forth by Locke
are met: there is enough left for others, and there is no waste of
92
resources. Some scholars who dealt with the application of the labor
theory to intellectual property rights examined the extent to which
intellectual property law is consistent with these principles and
suggested various revisions in the law in order to increase its correlation

Commons: A Lockean Justification for Patent Law Harmonization, 87 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF.
SOC’Y 141 (2005); Adam D. Moore, A Lockean Theory of Intellectual Property, 21 HAMLINE L.
REV. 65 (1997); Richard T. Jackson, A Lockean Approach to the Compulsory Patent Licensing
Controversy, 9 J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 117 (2004); Kurt L. Glitzenstein, A Normative and Positive
Analysis of the Scope of the Doctrine of Equivalents, 7 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 281 (1994).
89. See, e.g., Becker, supra note 75, at 609-10; Glitzenstein, supra note 88, at 314; Hughes,
supra note 75, at 297. A separate examination could be held under each possible justification for
the labor theory in order to evaluate whether it is justified, pursuant thereto, to grant property rights
in intangibles. Thus, for example, if the justification is the added value created by labor (see supra
notes 75-76 and accompanying text), then—assuming that the intangible products protected by
intellectual property law are valuable to society—intellectual property rights are justified. See with
respect to patent law, Hughes, supra note 75, at 307 (explaining why the current standards used to
measure patent eligibility are in accordance with an added value justification). If the justification is
not the added value created by labor but rather the need of the laborer herself for the fruits of her
labor (see supra note 80 and accompanying text), it can be argued that the labor theory does not
apply with respect to intellectual products, as the laborer does not need them as much as she needs
the physical means of sustenance dealt with directly by Locke. However, the laborer’s needs can be
said to include not only the need for means of physical sustenance but also artistic and intellectual
needs, the need of an individual to express herself, etc. See Gordon, supra note 69, at 1555.
Beyond that, it can be argued that property right in intellectual assets is what allows authors of
copyrightable works and inventors of patentable inventions to earn money and use it to purchase
whatever they need to sustain themselves physically.
90. See infra note 112 and accompanying text, for the proposition that the Lockean proviso
that “there is enough, and as good left in common for others” can be satisfied more easily with
respect to intangibles, due to their non-rival nature.
91. One question that arises, in this context, is whether intellectual labor is equivalent to the
physical labor discussed by Locke. The common answer is yes. See, e.g., Zemer, supra note 87, at
911; McJohn, supra note 88, at 44; Hughes, supra note 75, at 301, 304-05 (noting that the large
scope of activities associated with most research projects nowadays strengthens the conclusion that
research and development activities can be classified as labor).
92. For a discussion of these conditions in connection with intellectual property protection,
see generally Hughes, supra note 75, at 315-29; Nguyen, supra note 88, at 119-26.
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with the theory.93 However, the theory has never been accepted by
scholars or policymakers in the patent arena as a standard tool for the
evaluation of the patent system, which can supplement and enhance the
economic analysis in discussions with respect to the optimal design of
patent law. In the next section, this potential role of the labor theory will
be demonstrated in connection with the case of cumulative innovation.
B.

Cumulative Innovation in light of the Labor Theory

Assuming that the labor theory provides a valid justification for
granting property rights in technological inventions—i.e., for the patent
system—then in a cumulative innovation setting, this justification
clearly supports the grant of a patent for the first invention in a sequence
of inventions, as it is the fruit of its inventor’s labor. The interesting
question, though, is whether the theory can provide some guidance as to
the scope of such a patent. According to the theory, the right of a
laborer applies to all the assets produced by her work, subject only to the
external limitations on the acquisition of property (the condition that
enough is left for others and the no-waste prohibition), which will be
discussed separately below. Arguably, a follow-on invention should be
considered to be derived from the original inventor’s labor, at least in
instances where it would not have been developed otherwise (i.e., when
the first invention served as a but-for cause in its development
process).94 A possible conclusion is that property rights over follow-on
inventions should be allocated to the original inventor.
Yet, labor theory, as originally crafted, only applies to direct
products of a person’s labor and does not address a situation where,
based on such products, another person’s labor leads to entirely different
products. As follow-on inventions, by definition, are not the direct
products of the original inventor’s labor, labor theory does not mandate
that she owns the patents for such inventions on top of the patent for her
original invention.
This conclusion can be further supported by reverting to the various
explanations outlined above for the justification of the labor theory.

93. Thus, for example, scholars opined that the labor theory supports adopting an independent
development defense in patent law. See infra note 118 and accompanying text. For a different
example, see Sommer, supra note 88 (arguing that patent laws around the world should be
harmonized because only then would the patentee be able to get a full reward for her contribution to
society, as the labor theory mandates).
94. In other instances, the first invention may merely lower the cost of developing the second
invention or may allow for its more rapid development. See SCOTCHMER, supra note 35, at 127;
Scotchmer, supra note 19, at 31.
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According to the “added value approach,”95 the first inventor is not the
one who solely produced the social value embodied in a follow-on
invention, and therefore, she does not deserve a reward for such value in
the form of a property right in such invention. However, as she
96
contributed to this value, she should earn a portion of it, as a reward
97
for her contribution.
According to the “compensation for the
inconvenience” approach,98 the first inventor is not the one who has
suffered the inconvenience associated with the labor invested in the
development of the follow-on invention. Nevertheless, she may have a
just claim to a portion of the profits from such invention as
compensation for the inconvenience associated with the development of
the original invention, which served as a basis for the follow-on
invention and, while doing so, presumably lowered the amount of labor
required to develop it and the associated level of the follow-on
inventor’s inconvenience associated with her labor.
Under the
99
“necessity” approach, as a follow-on invention was not developed by
the original inventor, it cannot be considered to be directly related to her
effort to secure means of sustenance. However, it might be the case that,
in order to allow the original inventor to earn enough money, she should
be entitled to a portion of the profits in the markets for follow-on
inventions.100 Finally, under the “unjust enrichment” approach,101 as
long as the original inventor is compensated for her contribution to the
development of a follow-on invention, there is no need to grant her a
patent for such invention in order to avoid unjust enrichment. In fact,
such patent would unjustly enrich her at the expense of the follow-on
inventor.

95. See supra notes 75-76 and accompanying text.
96. This is not only in cases where the original invention served as a but-for cause in the
development process of the follow-on invention but also in cases where it merely lowered the cost
of its development or accelerated it. Therefore, and due to the difficulty in proving causation, it
seems that the same principal solution should be applied with respect to all these cases.
97. Such conclusion is also supported by the approach according to which a property right
should be limited to the value added by the laborer. See supra note 76 and accompanying text. The
value added by the original inventor includes the potential uses of her invention by others as an
inventive input, and thus, a portion of the value of the resulting follow-on invention, which reflects
such input, should be attributed to the original inventor’s labor, which must be rewarded
accordingly.
98. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
99. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
100. This may be particularly so in connection with research tools or other basic inventions
which do not have a stand-alone commercial value.
101. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
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Ultimately, labor theory does not justify the grant of a patent for a
follow-on invention to the original inventor, though it does call for
compensating the original inventor for her contribution to the
development of such invention by allowing her to win a portion of its
102
In order to ensure such
value that would reflect such contribution.
compensation, the exploitation of follow-on inventions needs to be
included in the scope of the original patent.103 This conclusion
104
correlates to the basic findings of the economic analysis, though the
need to take into account the magnitude of the original invention’s
contribution to the development of the follow-on invention in calculating
the compensation due to the original inventor105 is uniquely derived
from the analysis under the labor theory.106
As to the patent for the follow-on invention, it should be granted to
the follow-on inventor, considering that she is the one who actually
developed it. This invention is the fruit of her labor and according to all
the justifications for the labor theory, she is entitled to a property right in
it. She deserves a reward for the social value embedded in the
invention,107 is entitled to compensation for the inconvenience
associated with her labor, should be able to attain means of sustenance
through her labor, and should get protection against unjust enrichment.
Admittedly, the labor theory deals directly only with situations in which
the labor of one person is invested in common resources,108 while in the

102. In general, there is no need to interpret Locke’s theory as ruling in a dichotomist manner
that the only right that a person can have with respect to an object is a complete property right. See
also infra note 145 and accompanying text.
103. For a proposal, relying on economic analysis of the matter, to adopt an “Absolute Scope
Principle” in patent law in order to ensure compensation to original inventors in cumulative
innovation cases, see Tur-Sinai, supra note 20, at 742-44.
104. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
105. Admittedly, determining this parameter may prove difficult. The inventors themselves
surely cannot be expected to agree upon it, as each one may have an inflated idea of her own
contribution or not understand the other’s contribution. See, e.g., Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S.
Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCI. 698,
701 (1998); Robert Merges, Intellectual Property Rights and Bargaining Breakdown: The Case of
Blocking Patents, 62 TENN. L. REV. 75, 89-91 (1994); Turner, supra note 25, at 183. See generally
Linda Babcock & George Loewenstein, Explaining Bargaining Impasse: The Role of Self-Serving
Biases, 11 J. ECON. PERSP. 109 (1997) (discussing the tendency of parties to arrive at judgments that
reflect a self-serving bias: to conflate what is fair with what benefits oneself).
106. Under the economic analysis, the relevant parameters in determining an efficient division
of profits among the inventors are different, and include most notably the respective costs associated
with the development of each invention. See, e.g., Tur-Sinai, supra note 20, at 750.
107. This is also true under the position that property should be limited to the value added by
the laborer as the patent for the follow-on invention would be limited to the novel elements
contributed by the follow-on inventor. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
108. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
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cumulative innovation setting, the follow-on inventor also uses the
product of someone else’s labor as an input. However, as explained
above, it seems that all the underlying justifications for granting a
property right to the laborer apply with respect to a follow-on inventor as
well, and thus, allowing her to register a patent for her invention seems
supported by the theory.109
As mentioned above, Locke specified two external limitations on
the ability to acquire property, which will be discussed below.
1. The Duty to Leave Enough for Others
A condition for acquiring property, according to Locke, is that
“there is enough, and as good left in common for others”.110 One may
prevent others from using her work products only if there would remain
sufficient resources in the public domain to allow others to labor and
acquire property as well.111 In theory, it is easier to meet this condition
when the product is an intangible, in light of the non-rivalry
characterizing it, i.e., the fact that the use of an intangible by one does
not prevent simultaneous use of it (or the resources embedded in it) by
others.112 Yet, this conclusion could only hold if there were no property
rights in intangibles.113 Once intellectual property protection is in force,
there is an artificial want of the products covered by it, as others are no
longer free to use them, even if such use is non-rival by its nature.
Patent law is specifically designed to prevent competition by free riders,
and there is essentially no freedom to use an invention covered by a
109. The difference between the basic setting of labor performed on common resources only,
discussed by Locke, and the cumulative innovation setting, where the fruits of someone else’s labor
are used by the current laborer, should be given due account in requiring that a follow-on inventor
compensates the original inventor, as discussed above.
110. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
111. The resources of which a sufficient amount needs to be left for others are the raw
materials to which labor can be applied (rather than the work products). See, e.g., Gordon, supra
note 69, at 1562-64; Damstedt, supra note 68, at 1181; Zemer, supra note 87, at 928.
112. See, e.g., Hughes, supra note 75, at 315 (pointing out that every idea can be used by an
unlimited number of individuals).
113. Hughes acknowledges the fact that property rights in intangibles may affect the
possibilities of others, but he maintains that current intellectual property law does not provide
absolute exclusivity to the owner of the right—inter alia, as third parties cannot be prevented from
using in their thoughts ideas embedded in patents of others—and hence, it does not unduly limit the
possibilities of future creators and inventors. On the contrary, his position is that as soon as a new
idea has been commercialized and people know about it, it becomes easier for them to create and
invent. See id. at 315-16. This position is problematic, as the ability to think is generally not
sufficient to provide creators and inventors the freedom to continue being active in their field, in
contrast to the ability to actually use the protected intellectual products and/or to embody them in
the new product.
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patent during the patent term.114 The relevant inquiry is whether,
considering the exclusive rights provided by a patent, there is still
enough left for others following the registration of a patent for an
original invention.
As the condition that enough is left for others relates to the
underlying raw materials, i.e., the inventive inputs, it does not seem to
be affected by the patentee’s right to prevent mere imitators from using
her invention without permission.115 The requirement that enough be
left for others is meant to allow others to labor in order to attain property
and not to grant them permission to use the fruits of the original
laborer’s efforts. It seems that with respect to patent law, this limitation
on the scope of property is particularly relevant to the cumulative
innovation scenario, where the rights of the patentee need to be balanced
with the interests of other potential inventors.
In order to continue the inquiry as to whether sufficient “raw
materials” are left for the use of other potential inventors once a patent
for an original invention was registered, such raw materials must be
defined. The inventive inputs used in the development process of a new
invention seem to include: (1) the pre-existing art, i.e., the information
existing in the world pertaining to the subject matter of the invention116
and (2) a pool of raw ideas that have not yet been revealed by anyone.117
Arguably, when a person registers a patent, the pre-existing art
underlying her invention still remains available to be used by anyone,
and following the patent term, it is even expected to be widened by the
information embedded in the new patent. The raw idea underlying the
invention is arguably taken by the inventor, though as she was actually
the one drawing it out of “darkness,” it was not exactly withdrawn from
the public domain, and in any case, it can be reasonably assumed that
there are sufficient other raw ideas in the same imaginary pool waiting to
be revealed by others. Yet, these arguments seem to ignore the dynamic

114. This is subject, of course, to certain limited exceptions, including an experimental use
exception, to the extent it exists in various legal systems.
115. Cf. Gordon, supra note 69, at 1576 (focusing on copyright law and suggesting that the
creator could bar a commercial user “who has been drawn to the work solely in order to save
himself fungible resources such as money, effort, and time”).
116. It should be noted that the term “pre-existing art” used herein, which encompasses every
piece of information pre-existing in the world that may be used by the inventor, is not equivalent to
the more limited technical term “prior art,” which is used in connection with the examination of the
novelty and non-obviousness requirements in patent law.
117. See Damstedt, supra note 68, at 1192-93. For the notion that ideas are pre-existing in an
imaginary repository, see also Hughes, supra note 75, at 312 (discussing the view that new ideas are
“plucked from some platonic common”).
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nature of technology development, as will be explained below, first with
respect to the pre-existing art and thereafter with respect to the raw ideas
pool.
As for the pre-existing art, following the development of a new
invention and the registration of a patent for it, even though the
information which the inventor relied upon remains in the public
domain, the inventive uses that can be made with it are no longer the
same, and therefore, it is not clear at all that under the current design of
patent law a sufficient opportunity to invent is left for others. First, due
to the “winner-take-all” characteristic of the patent system, under which
a patentee can prevent even someone who independently developed the
same invention from using it, the underlying information clearly can no
longer be used for the same purpose for which it was used by the
original inventor (i.e., to develop the exact same invention).118
Moreover, following the registration of a patent, it may even be
difficult to develop other patent-eligible inventions based on the same
information underlying the original invention. Let us consider the
following scenario: Inventor A has just registered a patent for a cellular
phone antenna and inventor B wishes to develop a different antenna
based on the same prior art. This may not be feasible. The number of
different inventions that can be made using the same inventive inputs is
presumably limited, at least in some contexts. In addition, even if the
same pre-existing art could lead inventor B to a different type of
antenna, such new antenna may not be eligible for patent protection. To
be eligible for a patent, an invention must be held novel and non-obvious
against the prior art, which now includes, inter alia, the information
embedded in the patent just registered by inventor A. Depending on the
differences between the antennas, the new one may not be considered
novel and non-obvious. The forefront of scientific research and
technological development keeps moving on, and this is reflected in the
continuously evolving composition of the prior art used by patent

118. It can be argued, then, that in order to satisfy the requirement that enough is left for others
(particularly in its broad interpretation—see supra note 70), this fundamental patent law principle
should be abandoned. Cf. Becker, supra note 75, at 629 (noting that whoever independently
developed the invention labored as well and therefore is entitled to a property right exactly like the
original inventor); Damstedt, supra note 68, at 1186 (recommending to adopt an independent
development defense against infringement based on Locke’s theory); Moore, supra note 88, at 100
(emphasizing the need to not make the situation of the second inventor worse compared to his
situation before the registration of the patent by the original inventor). It should be noted, however,
that, even if we allow independent development, after the registration of a patent for the original
invention and the public disclosure of the relevant information, the chance that other potential
inventors in the same field will not be exposed to it (and are also able to prove it) is small.
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examiners to evaluate patent applications. For these reasons, following
the registration of a patent, the opportunity of others to use the same preexisting art underlying it as the basis for further novel and non-obvious
inventions is narrowed down. In order to increase the chances of future
inventors to develop patentable inventions, it seems that they should be
allowed to use or even incorporate previously patented inventions in
their projects. In the example used above, such policy would allow
inventor B to work on an improvement of inventor A’s antenna, rather
than a mere version for such antenna developed based on the same preexisting art.
Moreover, a new invention often changes the scientific and
technological landscape, and by doing so, it affects opportunities for
research and development by future inventors.119 For example, a new
patented laboratory research tool in the biotechnology field may be
radically more efficient and achieve far better results than previous
technologies used for that purpose. If this is the case, then inventors
forced to continue using such old technologies may quickly find
themselves out of the game. This effect may be even stronger when the
original invention is a pioneer invention, which can potentially serve as
the basis for multiple applications in a variety of technological fields, or
when it becomes a standard in the relevant industry.120
For all these reasons, it seems fair to say that, at least in some
instances, an inventor who registers a patent for her invention attaches
her property right, indirectly, to the underlying materials as well, and
thus, withdraws them from the public domain in terms of the practical
ability to reuse them for the purpose of developing other patentable
inventions. An argument can be made that while the inventor detracts
something from the public domain, she also enriches it by disclosing the
details of her invention in a manner that will allow the public to use it at
the end of the patent term.121 Yet, timing matters. Technologies become
obsolete rapidly, and at the end of the patent term, the ability to use the
invention as the basis for the development of follow-on inventions may
not be relevant anymore. Beyond that, as the issue at stake is an
119. A new invention may also cause a shift in consumer preferences, which then influences
the demand for certain follow-on inventions. Cf. Gordon, supra note 69, at 1567-70 (discussing the
effect of a new intellectual product on the “stream of culture and events”).
120. Cf. Gordon, supra note 69, at 1600 (pointing out that giving ownership in a work that has
come to serve as standard may not leave enough opportunities for others).
121. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006) (setting forth the requirement that as part of the patent
application, a written description of the invention shall be made, “in such full, clear, concise, and
exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most
nearly connected, to make and use the same”).
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opportunity to work and acquire property, having “enough for others” in
twenty years cannot be considered satisfactory. Thus, in order to
provide other inventors with a real opportunity to engage in research and
development and to attain property rights in inventions, it seems that
they should be allowed to use the information located at the forefront of
the relevant technological field immediately—i.e., not only the public
domain information underlying the original invention but the proprietary
information embedded in it as well.
As for the raw idea at the basis of the invention, the more we treat it
as if it was drawn out of a pool that was originally free for use by every
member of society,122 the more it can be said that when registering a
patent for her invention, the inventor impoverished the public domain by
depleting it of something that others might have discovered more or less
at the same time.123 In any case, the question is whether, once the
inventor acquired property rights over her idea, there are enough such
ideas left for others. Even under an assumption that the amount of ideas
in such imaginary pool is infinite,124 human history tells that such ideas
are bound to be revealed in a gradual manner, depending, inter alia, on
the state of knowledge at the relevant time. At any given period there
are, on a practical level, only a limited number of potential paths for
research and development.125 Therefore, once the original inventor
secured her exclusivity in her invention, she may have narrowed down
the current possibilities available for others. This conclusion is even
stronger when the inquiry is narrowed down to the specific technological
field at stake.126
A possible counterargument is that, as a patentable invention
pushes forward the forefront of technological research and opens up new

122. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
123. As to the likelihood that someone else would discover the same patented invention, see
Moore, supra note 88, at 103; Jackson, supra note 88, at 127. What increases the likelihood of this
occurring is the fact that an invention is often a solution to a current need.
124. This is a philosophical question without any clear answer. See, e.g., Damstedt, supra note
68, at 1191 n.57.
125. Cf. Nguyen, supra note 88, at 122 (noting that “while ideas are technically limitless, the
realm of useful and worthwhile ideas is much more focused and accessible only to those who have
access to previous intellectual products”); PETER DRAHOS, A PHILOSOPHY OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY 51 (1995) (pointing out that “[e]ven where the stock of abstract objects is infinite, the
human capacity to exploit that stock at any given moment is conditioned by the state of cultural and
scientific knowledge which exists at that historical moment”).
126. This is related to the way this Lockean proviso is interpreted in general. See supra note
70. In the specific context dealt with herein, the question is whether it is enough that a general
opportunity to work (or invent) is left open or whether it is specifically required that an opportunity
to develop further inventions in the same technological field remain open.
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avenues for further development, it can increase the chances that future
inventors will be able to pull new ideas from the common pool.127
However, this is generally true only insomuch as uses of the patented
invention by follow-on inventors are permitted.128 A breakthrough
invention in the field of nanotechnology does not broaden research and
development opportunities in the field, unless other inventors are
allowed to use it, improve upon it, or incorporate it in their own
invention. In other words, in order to be able to reveal the next-in-turn
idea, which is situated deeper in the “pool,” the current inventor must be
allowed to “stand on the shoulders” of her predecessor.129 This
conclusion is derived directly from the cumulative nature of scientific
research and technological development. If an inventor who registers a
patent for an original invention is allowed control over the entire
“prospect”130 marked by her invention and if other inventors are not
allowed to use the patented invention for the purpose of developing
follow-on inventions, then such other inventors’ opportunity to engage
in research and development is narrowed down, and thus again, not
enough is left for others.131
To summarize, the development of a new invention and the
registration of a patent for it may affect opportunities to engage in
research and development. In many cases, in order to allow inventors a
real opportunity to participate in the game, they should be allowed to
make use of prior inventions. The first Lockean proviso for the
acquisition of property, thus, supports the adoption of an experimental
use exception in patent law.132
2. The No Waste Prohibition
As mentioned earlier, the second Lockean condition for the
acquisition of property is that there is no waste of work products.
Scholars analyzing the labor theory have suggested a few possible

127. Cf. Hughes, supra note 75, at 316; Sommer, supra note 88, at 159.
128. Cf. supra note 113 and accompanying text.
129. See supra note 19, for Newton’s famous quote.
130. See, with respect to the “prospect” theory, supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text.
131. Cf. Jackson, supra note 88, at 135 (noting that “even if the commons is not affected by
removing from it the information found in the patent, the state of the art that lies just beyond the
patent itself cannot be explored without fear that the pioneer will refuse to grant a license”).
132. The arguments leading to this conclusion seem to apply, in equal force, to all scenarios of
cumulative innovation, including the research tools scenario. Cf. supra note 57 and accompanying
text (describing various approaches taken by scholars analyzing the question of how wide the
experimental use exception should be from an economic perspective).
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explanations for the rationale behind the no waste prohibition133: (1)
there might be a shortage as a result of the waste of products; (2) labor
itself would be wasted without bringing any benefit to the laborer; and
(3) “[n]othing was made by God for Man to spoil or destroy.”134
While this prohibition may not be significant in connection with
135
it can be very important in connection with
tangible objects,
intellectual property in light of the non-rival nature of intangibles.136 An
intellectual product can serve as the basis for numerous tangible copies
137
so that an unlimited number of individuals can use it
embedding it
simultaneously. Accordingly, waste seemingly occurs every time a
certain potential use of an intellectual product that could have brought
benefit to the user does not materialize such that the social value of the
product is not fully realized.138
This means that the no waste prohibition is relevant not only with
respect to the relationship of the intellectual property owner with future
inventors and creators (as the previous Lockean proviso)139 but also with
respect to her relationship with potential end users of the product. For
example, if a person developing a certain invention refuses to
commercialize it, she is arguably wasting it because there are users that
could have benefitted from using it. Waste also occurs when a person
sells the product at such a high price that its potential consumers cannot
purchase it.140

133. See Hughes, supra note 75, at 327-39; Damstedt, supra note 68, at 1193-94.
134. LOCKE, supra note 62, at 290.
135. This is in light of the fact that Locke acknowledges the legitimacy of exchange so it is
possible to avoid wasting an asset not only by privately using it but also by selling it. See supra
note 71 and accompanying text.
136. See text accompanying supra note 21.
137. When the invention is a process invention, as opposed to a product invention, there is not
even a need for duplicating a physical artifact.
138. See Damstedt, supra note 68, at 1196-97; Nguyen, supra note 88, at 121.
139. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
140. This is the principal argument of Damstedt, supra note 68, who maintains that a refusal to
sell units of an intangible violates the no waste prohibition and that such violation should lead to the
deprivation of a property right with respect to such units. Hence, his conclusion is that pricing an
intangible at a price higher than zero creates a right of fair use to all the ones evaluating the asset at
a price higher than zero but lower than the price set by the laborer. According to his approach, the
laborer has no right to prevent individuals from using units of the product that are not already being
used by others. See supra note 68, at 1201-02. Damstedt emphasizes that a fair use right of this
type is much wider than the fair use doctrine currently in force under copyright law in various legal
systems (id. at 1215), while in patent law there is no such doctrine at all (Damstedt, supra note 68,
at 1183). This broad argument is outside the scope of the discussion. It should be noted, though,
that there seems to be a great difficulty in receiving reliable information from potential users about
the value of the product for them, considering that they would be able to enjoy free use of it if they
declared a value lower than the price set for the product. See Damstedt, supra note 68, at 1201 n.91.
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In the cumulative innovation context, it seems that the no waste
prohibition strengthens the conclusion that the use of a patented
invention for research and development purposes should be allowed
even without the patentee’s consent, otherwise, there shall be waste.141
Furthermore, even after the development of a follow-on invention, legal
intervention may still be warranted under the no waste prohibition if a
license to commercialize such invention cannot be secured voluntarily
142
In such case, the potential waste would
from the original inventor.
relate to uses of the follow-on invention rather than uses of the original
invention. One position taken in the literature dealing with labor theory
states that waste should result in a complete loss of the property right
with respect to the wasted portion.143 The application of this position, in
the context discussed herein, would supposedly lead to a rule allowing a
follow-on inventor, who has not received permission from the original
inventor to commercialize her invention, to nevertheless do so free of
charge.144 Yet, this is an extreme position not mandated by the labor
145
If it is possible to find a less extreme way, in terms of its
theory.
effects on the interests of the original inventor, to avoid the potential
waste resulting from the lack of agreement between the inventors with
respect to the commercialization of the follow-on invention, it is
preferable. And indeed, it is possible to adopt liability rule doctrines that
would allow the follow-on inventor to commercialize her invention in
return for an appropriate royalty payable to the original inventor.146
Such royalty would minimize the damage to the original inventor's
interests.

Beyond that, it is not necessarily true that waste should result in a complete loss of the property
right. See infra note 145 and accompanying text.
141. The original patentee herself cannot be expected to develop on her own all potential
follow-on inventions, as she may lack the requisite incentive and ability to do so. See Tur-Sinai,
supra note 20, at 734-35.
142. Clearly, such license would only be required when commercialization of the follow-on
invention is considered within the scope of the original patent. This would be the case if an
“Absolute Scope Principle” in patent law is embraced. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
143. See Damstedt, supra note 68, at 1182, 1214. As a result, Damstedt argues, as explained
above, that a broad fair use right should be acknowledged in intellectual property law. See supra
note 140.
144. According to this position, then, a complete exemption should be granted to follow-on
inventors. Cf. supra note 59 and accompanying text (describing the relevant discussion under the
economic theory).
145. Cf. Gordon, supra note 69, at 1538 (noting, with respect to the first Lockean proviso, that
it “can yield outcomes other than the elimination of all claims by the laborer”).
146. Cf. supra note 60 and accompanying text (describing the relevant discussion under the
economic theory).
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3. Summary
The analysis of cumulative innovation under labor theory leads to
the following conclusions. With respect to the development stage, the
labor theory supports the adoption of a wide experimental use exception,
ensuring freedom to engage in follow-on research and development in a
variety of circumstances.147 Following the development of a follow-on
invention, the theory supports allowing the inventor to register a patent
for it. The original inventor should be allowed to earn a portion of the
profits from follow-on inventions, in light of her contribution to their
development. Therefore, the commercial exploitation of follow-on
inventions should be considered within the scope of the original patent.
Where the inventors cannot reach a voluntary agreement with respect to
the exploitation of the follow-on invention, the labor theory supports the
application of liability rule doctrines (rather than an exemption doctrine),
allowing non-consented exploitation in return for a reasonable royalty.
The division of profits among the inventors, in cases where it is not
agreed upon between them, should reflect as much as possible their
respective contributions to the development of the follow-on invention.
Notably, this last conclusion is uniquely based on the analysis under the
labor theory.148
The fact that the analysis under the labor theory results in the
foregoing conclusions may surprise those who believe that natural rights
theories necessarily support the strengthening of property rights. Such
theories, as a general matter, also take into account the interests of the
public.149 Beyond that, in the particular situation at hand, as there is
more than one property owner, the conclusions reflect the special need
for a balancing solution.

147. For a comparison of this conclusion with the results of the economic analysis, see supra
note 132.
148. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
149. Cf. Lim, supra note 74, at 563 (examining potential application of classical theories of
natural law to patent law and noting that an approach based on natural law would try to achieve a
balance between acknowledging the rights of the inventor and her duties to the community).
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IV. THE PERSONALITY THEORY
A.

General

Another theory that is often used to justify property rights is
Hegel’s personality theory,150 as refined by Professor Radin.151
According to the personality theory, private property is necessary as a
means for developing and realizing one’s personality. Pursuant to
Hegel, a person cannot begin to realize her self-identity until she is given
an opportunity to exercise her will on external objects in her
surroundings.152 In order for a person to enjoy freedom of action with
respect to assets and a sense of security with respect to the continuity of
her relationship with them, and in order for her to be able to uniquely
identify herself based on her relationship with such assets, she should be
provided a certain level of control over the assets, which is the reason
that the institution of private property is necessary.153
A direct conclusion of these basic insights is that every person
should be provided a threshold amount of property that would enable her
to function as a free individual and develop her personality. Yet,
Professor Radin has gone a step further in her attempt to use the
personality theory as the basis for detailed recommendations with
respect to the appropriate design of property protection. According to
Radin, a distinction should be made between various types of objects
based on how closely they are bound up with personhood. At one end of
the spectrum, there are certain objects that are often part of the way
human beings constitute themselves as continuing personal entities in
the world (“personal property”)—a wedding ring, a portrait, an
heirloom, or a house. At the other end of the spectrum, there are objects
held for purely instrumental reasons (“fungible property”)—money, a
share certificate, an automobile in the hands of a dealer, or an

150. G.W.F. HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT (S.W. Dyde trans., Prometheus Books ed. 1996)
(1821).
151. Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957 (1982)
[hereinafter Radin, Personhood]. See also Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV.
L. REV. 1849 (1987). For a recent criticism of Radin’s version of the personality theory, see Jeanne
L. Schroeder, Unnatural Rights: Hegel and Intellectual Property, 60 U. MIAMI L. REV. 453 (2006)
(claiming that Radin’s version is too remote from the original Hegelian theory to be considered
derived from it). For Radin’s treatment of the differences between her thesis and Hegel’s theory,
see Radin, Personhood, at 977-78.
152. HEGEL, supra note 150, at 51-52.
153. Id. See also Radin, Personhood, supra note 151, at 957, 972-73; Lim, supra note 74, at
579; Hughes, supra note 75, at 330; Brian M. Hoffstadt, Dispossession, Intellectual Property, and
the Sin of Theoretical Homogeneity, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 909, 934, 948 (2007).
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undeveloped tract of land in the hands of a contractor.154 An indicator of
an object being “personal” is that its loss cannot be compensated through
payment or replacement with another object of a similar market value
due to its unique value to its owner; whereas, a “fungible” object, by
definition, is perfectly replaceable with other goods of equal market
value.155 Radin does not focus on the development process of an object
but rather on the relationship formed between the object and whoever
holds it. Accordingly, the same object can be considered personal or
fungible, depending on the identity of its current holder.156 Radin
acknowledges that in certain cases, a person’s attachment to an object
may not be vital to her healthy self-constitution but rather fetishistic in
its nature. In such cases, she maintains that the object should not be
classified as personal property.157
Radin’s basic argument, on the normative level, is that legal rules
should be designed with sensitivity to the abovementioned distinction.
In general, the more a relationship to an object is located toward the
personal end of the continuum, the more the entitlement should be
protected.158 Radin suggests that, at least in certain cases, interests in
personal property should be protected against invasion by the
government and against cancellation by conflicting fungible property
claims of other people by property rules, as no compensation for their
taking could be just.159 On the contrary, where an entitlement is
fungible, its protection by liability rules would generally be sufficient,
while sometimes it may even be justified to allow the taking of fungible
property without any compensation at all.160 Radin also maintains that

154. Radin, Personhood, supra note 151, at 959-60.
155. For a description of Radin’s insight with respect to the distinction between personal
objects and fungible objects as part of a broader phenomenon, the existence of a gap between the
price in which the holder of an object is willing to sell it and the price which buyers are willing to
pay for the same object in the market, see Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, A Theory of
Property, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 531, 568 (2005). The gap might be due to sentimental causes as
Radin points out, but it might also be caused by a variety of other reasons, some rational and others
affected by cognitive biases, such as the “endowment effect”. Id.
156. Radin, Personhood, supra note 151, at 987. See also Steven Cherensky, A Penny for
Their Thoughts: Employee-Inventors, Preinvention Assignment Agreements, Property, and
Personhood, 81 CAL. L. REV. 595, 645 (1993).
157. Radin, Personhood, supra note 151, at 968-70. The judgment that a certain relationship
between a person and an object is non-healthy should be based, according to Radin, on an objective
moral consensus. Id. For an argument that this may result in conservatism and in perpetuation of
the status quo, see Stephen J. Schnably, Property and Pragmatism: A Critique of Radin’s Theory of
Property and Personhood, 45 STAN. L. REV. 347, 355, 361, 404 (1993).
158. Radin, Personhood, supra note 151, at 986.
159. Id. at 988, 1005, 1014-15.
160. Id.
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in case of a conflict between fungible property rights and non-property
interests in personhood, such as free speech rights, it would sometimes
be appropriate to allow the latter interests to take precedence.161
Radin’s personality theory has been criticized from various angles.
One argument is that there is no basis for Radin’s thesis in Hegel’s work,
where property plays a very formal role—it allows people to create legal
relationships with each other and thus turn from abstract entities into
individuals with a concrete existence.162 A different criticism of Radin
turns against the sweeping classification of objects used for business
purposes as fungible property, implied from her writing. An individual
may spend most of her time in the business, upon which her current
welfare and future plans are dependent. Sometimes it is exactly through
the business that an individual realizes her personal talents and
qualities.163 Radin’s theory can also be criticized for necessitating
classifications and tests in order to assess the level of existence of a
personhood interest in individual cases.164
Radin’s normative
conclusions can be criticized as well. For example, even if protection of
fungible property through liability rules (as opposed to property rules)
can be justified, it is not clear why it is justified to weaken protection for
such property even more by allowing for its non-compensated taking in
certain cases.165

161. Id. at 1008-13.
162. Schroeder, supra note 151, at 454-55, 464, 466-69, 473, 476. Schroeder emphasizes that
the analysis of property by Hegel does not address all aspects of personality but only addresses the
formal role described above. Therefore, Hegel’s theory can be used in support of a proposition
whereby a modern state should establish a minimal level of private property, allowing the formation
of legal relationships between individuals. However, it does not flow from the theory that society
has to respect this or another type of property or has to provide a certain degree of protection to a
certain group of assets, and the theory certainly does not provide any concrete guidance on whether
any property (or intellectual property) doctrine is appropriate or not.
163. See LEWINSOHN-ZAMIR, supra note 82, at 79. See also Mary L. Clark, Reconstructing the
World Trade Center: An Argument for the Applicability of Personhood Theory to Commercial
Property Ownership and Use, 109 PENN ST. L. REV. 815, 815-16, 818-19, 821 (2005) (noting that
ownership and use of commercial property may have a significant impact on self-identity of
individuals and criticizing Radin for failing to take it into account).
164. For an argument that Radin’s analysis complicated the notion of property, see generally
Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 155, at 551 (pointing out that property, under Radin’s analysis,
can no longer be treated as a generic relationship between people with respect to objects because her
analysis demands an inquiry as to the type of object at stake and as to the role that such object plays
in the development of the personality of the individual claiming rights in it); Hughes, supra note 75,
at 339 (arguing that a property system protecting personality would encounter difficulties in finding
reliable indicators with respect to the question of whether people have a personality interest in
specific objects or not).
165. See LEWINSOHN-ZAMIR, supra note 82, at 78-79.
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Technological Innovation and the Personality Theory

The personality theory has been used, not infrequently, in scholarly
discussions of intellectual property law in general and copyright law in
particular.166 The common position in the literature is that intellectual
products are closer to the personal end of Radin’s continuum of objects.
Such assets are not only held by an individual but are also her creation,
and thus, reflect her personality. As a result, the personal bond between
the individual and such assets is particularly strong.167 Accordingly,
various scholars used the personality theory in support of arguments
calling for the strengthening of authors’ rights and, in particular, her
moral rights, including the right of attribution and the right of
integrity.168 It should be noted that this approach, according to which a
personhood interest—justifying an increased level of protection—can
result from the fact that an object was created by someone whose
personality is embedded in it,169 deviates from Radin’s version of the
personality theory, which focuses on the attachment created between an
object and its holder, while attributing no significance to the
development process of the object.170

166. See generally Becker, supra note 75; Amie N. Broder, Comparing Apples to APPLs:
Importing the Doctrine of Adverse Possession in Real Property to Patent Law, 2 N.Y.U. J.L. &
LIBERTY 557, 573 (2007); Cherensky, supra note 156; Glitzenstein, supra note 88, at 319-22;
Hoffstadt, supra note 153; Hughes, supra note 75; Justin Hughes, The Personality Interest of Artists
and Inventors in Intellectual Property, 16 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 81 (1998); Lim, supra note
74; McJohn, supra note 88, at 45; Nguyen, supra note 88, at 126-30; Opderbeck, supra note 79.
167. See Hughes, supra note 75, at 330, 365; Becker, supra note 75, at 610; Hoffstadt, supra
note 153, at 935; McJohn, supra note 88, at 45; Opderbeck, supra note 79, at 319.
168. See, e.g., Hughes, supra note 166, at 165 (as to the right of attribution); Edward J.
Damich, The Right of Personality: A Common-Law Basis for the Protection of the Moral Rights of
Authors, 23 GA. L. REV. 1, 4 (1988) (as to the right of integrity; though not explicitly mentioning
the personality theory as such, the article’s thesis is grounded in the notion that artistic works reflect
the creative personalities of their authors).
169. For a discussion of various personality aspects that may come into effect in the process of
creating an intellectual product, see Hughes, supra note 166, at 82.
170. See supra note 156 and accompanying text. This approach is certainly remote from
Hegel’s original theory. See supra note 162 for Schroeder’s position that Hegel’s theory does not
mandate recognition of specific rights in assets. Schroeder specifically points out that Hegel’s
theory cannot be legitimately used to justify moral rights or other increased rights with respect to
intellectual property. According to her, any other interpretation, representing a romantic conception
of personality, would be completely rejected by Hegel. Works of authorship should be considered
external to personality just like any other object of property. See Schroeder, supra note 151, at 457,
498-99. Interestingly, the approach described in the text has early roots in the writings of Kant and
Fichte, who viewed literary works as external expressions of their authors’ personalities. See
generally DRAHOS, supra note 125, at 80-81; DAVID SAUNDERS, AUTHORSHIP AND COPYRIGHT
106-15 (1992).
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Seemingly such an approach, which relies on the great extent to
which an intellectual product reflects the personality of its creator, is less
applicable with respect to technological inventions, the subject matter of
patent protection, than with respect to creative works of authorship, the
subject matter of copyright protection.
While searching for a
technological solution for a given problem, e.g., a cure for a certain
disease, an inventor is guided by the existing knowledge in the relevant
field and is limited by various constraints—scientific, technological and
commercial—and thus, has much less room to express her personality.171
The fact that inventions are often being conceived simultaneously by
various individuals172 also suggests that technological properties do not
necessarily reflect the personality of their creators but rather some more
generic notions. Nevertheless, it seems that there is still an opportunity
for an inventor to express her unique personality in a new invention, if
only the more subtle aspects of her personality, observable perhaps by
professionals in the relevant field.173 For example, it may be possible,
within the efficiency constraints faced by computer hardware engineers,
to design a specific hardware device in various ways, each one
representing a different personal style for accomplishing the task.174
Moreover, the argument that an inventor cannot bring her unique
personality into effect in her work seems to be based on a very narrow
construction of the notion of personality. Even if it is true that in the
development process of an invention there is generally no room for
nuances reflecting the inventor’s emotional composition or her aesthetic
preferences as might commonly be the case in artistic works, a
technological invention is still a unique intellectual product where the
inventor’s education, intellectual skills, professional experience, vision,
and imagination all come into play.175 At the same time, it should be
noted that not all copyright-protected works strongly reflect the
personality of their authors. Copyright law protects, inter alia, certain

171. See Hughes, supra note 75, at 341 (noting, for example, that “[i]n inventing the light bulb,
Edison searched for the filament material that would burn the longest, not a filament that would
reflect his personality”). See also Lim, supra note 74, at 579 (pointing out that inventions are
generally a solution to a specific problem and not a reflection of the personality of an individual).
172. See supra note 123.
173. See generally Lim, supra note 74, at 580; Hughes, supra note 75, at 342-43; Cherensky,
supra note 156, at 649-52.
174. Cf. Lim, supra note 74, at 580.
175. Cf. Cherensky, supra note 156, at 598 (noting that the interest of the employee in an
intellectual product developed by her may be based on investment of personal capital: “training and
education, personality, individual genius, extraordinary effort, creative spark, and even divine
revelation”).
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“works of low authorship, such as maps, nautical charts, and factual
compilations,”176 the content of which is dictated to a large extent by
their practical purpose. Copyright protection also applies with respect to
an important class of technological works, i.e., computer software. In
fact, even in the more traditional categories of artistic works, creative
authorship is subject to certain constraints that limit one’s freedom to
artistically express herself. For example, in the creation of a movie, due
consideration must be given to the expected attention span of the
audience, to the budget constraints, and to the characteristics of the
relevant genre.177 To summarize, even if there is some difference
between technological inventions and copyright-protected works with
respect to the possibility of expressing one’s personality in the product,
it is not a vast difference. It seems that at least in certain cases there
may be a personhood interest in a technological invention, resulting
from the fact that the product reflects the personality of the individual
who developed it.178
Moreover, it seems that a personality bond in the original sense
discussed by Radin—i.e., a bond created between the object and its
holder, regardless of the development process of the object,179 may exist
as well with respect to technological inventions. Indeed, in contrast to a
wedding ring or a family portrait, which is closely guarded by its owner,
technological inventions are often not only used by their owners in the
business sphere of their lives (as opposed to the private sphere),180 but
are also commercialized by them. Arguably, if a person commercializes
an object, she cannot have a personality interest in it. However,
intellectual products are non-rival by their nature, so the owner of an
invention can commercialize it (i.e., sell physical embodiments of it
and/or grant licenses to use it) without abandoning her ownership of
it.181 One of the basic principles of intellectual property law is the
176. Oskar Liivak, Maintaining Competition in Copying: Narrowing the Scope of Gene
Patents, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 177, 184 (2007).
177. See generally Michal Shur-Ofry, The (Copyright) Law of Genre: A Network Perspective
on Copyright Protection of Cultural Genres, 2 FLA. ENT. L. REV. 60 (2008) (noting the important
role of genres in various artistic and cultural fields).
178. Cf. Hughes, supra note 166, at 143-44 (pointing out that, even if there is no personal
expression in an invention, a personal intention is invested in its creation, and therefore, the
personality of the inventor is uniquely reflected in it).
179. See supra note 156.
180. But see supra note 163 and accompanying text (criticizing this distinction).
181. Cf. Hughes, supra note 166, at 86; Opderbeck, supra note 79, at 319. Clearly, when it
comes to a complete assignment of intellectual property rights, the personality theory runs into a
paradox. The transfer indicates that the individual no longer has a personality interest in the
product, so the justification for allowing her to dictate the terms of the transfer is unclear. See
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separation between the intellectual work itself and its physical
embodiments; the sale of a physical artifact that embodies a protected
intellectual product is not equivalent to a transfer of ownership in such
underlying intellectual product. The commercialization of intellectual
property (except when an exclusive license is granted) does not damage
the ability of its owner to keep on using it on her own,182 or even, to
continue commercializing it. Therefore, the fact that technological
inventions are often commercialized by their owners does not
necessarily place them at the fungible end of Radin’s continuum of
objects. In fact, commercialization of an intellectual product may
contribute to the development of its owner’s personality.
By
commercializing an intellectual product, the inventor or author reveals
herself to other individuals, and the payment she receives for the
opportunity to use her product constitutes an act of recognition of her by
such individuals.183
In fact, the personality interest in technological inventions may be
particularly strong. An inventor is often identified with her inventions—
Thomas Edison is recognized first and foremost as the inventor of the
light bulb—and such inventions become the basis for her business and
commercial activity, i.e., for her connections with other individuals
through which she defines herself. Based on the commercial activity
involving her inventions, the inventor acquires recognition, respect, and
appreciation by others. The invention becomes part of the public
persona of the inventor.184 The fact that the inventor is the one who
developed the invention surely plays an important role in the formation
of others’ evaluation of her, especially when it comes to the relevant
research community.185 Yet, it is possible that even an owner by
assignment of an invention would develop, as time goes by, a
personality interest in it, as a result of her business and commercial uses
of it, while the public learns to recognize her as a unique subject—the
Hughes, supra note 75, at 346-47. But see Schroeder, supra note 151, at 484 (noting that there is no
contradiction between the ability to transfer an asset and owning a personality interest in such asset,
in the original meaning discussed by Hegel).
182. This is in contrast to the case of a physical object, which from the moment of its sale or
lease can no longer be used by its owner (in the case of a lease, for a temporary period, and in the
case of a sale, indefinitely).
183. See Hughes, supra note 75, at 349-51. Hughes adds that the money earned as a result of
the commercialization of the asset encourages the creation of further works which reflect the
personality of their creator. Id.
184. Cf. Hughes, supra note 75, at 343. For the status attached to success in technological
development, see, for example, McJohn, supra note 88, at 42; Broder, supra note 166, at 573 n.59.
185. Interestingly, it is a prevalent practice among scientists and engineers to list patent
applications in their resumes.
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owner of said invention. The identification with an invention may be
strong in comparison with the identification with other types of business
assets in light of the inherent uniqueness of an invention.186
All in all, it seems that in many cases a personhood interest may
develop with respect to a technological invention. The personality
theory thus provides an additional justification for the exclusive rights
granted to an inventor under the patent system. Absent exclusivity, the
inventor’s competitors may freely use her invention. This would
diminish her ability to uniquely identify herself with the invention and
enjoy adequate recognition by others.
This, though, is only true with respect to the relationship between
the inventor and free riders seeking to imitate her invention and use it
free of charge. In the special context of cumulative innovation, where
other researchers and inventors may also have a personality interest
worthy of protection, the situation may become more complicated as
will be explored next.
C.

Cumulative Innovation in light of the Personality Theory

Entrusting control over research uses of an invention in the hands
of the inventor would deny other potential inventors an opportunity to
develop follow-on inventions based on such invention, narrowing their
opportunities to engage in research and development activity and
lowering their chances of expressing their personality through such
activity. Thus, in the cumulative innovation scenario, there is seemingly
a conflict between the personality interest of one individual and the
opportunity of other individuals to develop their own personality
interests.187 In order to allow potential inventors a real chance to
develop inventions in which they may hold a personhood interest in the
future and given that technology often develops in a cumulative manner,
it seems that inventors should be allowed to use patented inventions
developed by their predecessors in the course of their own research and
development.188 The personality theory, then, seems to support the

186. The patent-eligibility criteria, including the novelty and non-obviousness requirements,
ensure the uniqueness of an invention. See, as to the tendency of inventors to strongly identify with
their inventions, Merges, supra note 105, at 90 n.61.
187. Cf. Hughes, supra note 166, at 81-82 (noting that the personality theory mandates a
balance between the personality theory of the creator in her work and the personality interest of
consumers who will use her work in their own future acts of creation).
188. It could theoretically be argued that there are enough opportunities to engage in research
and development even without using patented inventions. But see discussion supra Part III.B.1
(with respect to the Lockean proviso that enough is left for others).
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argument that there is a need to adopt an experimental use exception in
patent law, allowing the use of an invention for research and
development purposes even without the original inventor’s
permission.189 This conclusion is not limited to a specific scenario of
cumulative innovation.190 If, alongside such exception, there would be a
rule ensuring that the original inventor is compensated for the use of her
invention, at least in cases where such use has resulted in the
development of a successful follow-on invention, then the damage to the
personality interest of the first inventor resulting from the adoption of an
experimental use exception would be mitigated.191
To be sure, after the development of a follow-on invention, the
follow-on inventor may have a personality interest in it. In order to
protect her personality interest, the follow-on inventor should be allowed
to register a patent, provided that her invention meets the general criteria
for patent-eligibility. The personality theory, then, supports the
conclusion that the registration of a patent for a follow-on invention
should be allowed.192
The realization that each inventor has a personality interest in her
invention supports the conclusion that each inventor should be allowed
to commercially exploit her patent and, while doing so, develop a unique
identity and earn recognition from others, as explained above. The
original inventor may, in most cases, continue exploiting her patent even
after the development of a follow-on invention and the registration of a
patent for it.193 However, in order to ensure the ability of the second
inventor to do so as well, assuming that the exploitation of the follow-on
invention is considered within the scope of the original invention,194

189. Cf. William W. Fisher III, Symposium Cyberspace & The Law: Privacy, Property, and
Crime in the Virtual Frontier: The Implications for Law of User Innovation, 94 MINN. L. REV.
1417, 1471-72 (2010) (maintaining that user innovation offers opportunities for self-fulfillment and
recommending that “[t]he government, through law, should therefore strive to open more
opportunities for user innovation than manufacturers and the current population of users, left to their
own devices, would create”).
190. For a similar conclusion under the labor theory, see supra note 132 and accompanying
text. Cf. supra note 57 (describing various approaches taken by scholars analyzing the matter from
an economic perspective to the question of how wide the experimental use exception should be).
191. See also infra note 197 and accompanying text.
192. For a similar conclusion under the labor theory, see supra notes 107-09 and
accompanying text.
193. This would not be true in the case of an improvement that completely substitutes for the
original invention. See infra notes 213-15 and accompanying text as to the improvements scenario.
194. This would be the case if an “Absolute Scope Principle” in patent law is embraced. See
supra note 103 and accompanying text.

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol45/iss1/5

40

Tur-Sinai: Beyond Incentives

10-TUR-SINAI_MACRO FINAL.DOCM

2012]

2/24/2012 9:57 AM

BEYOND INCENTIVES

283

liability rule doctrines should be adopted.195 The main effects of liability
rule doctrines would likely be to influence the negotiating positions of
the inventors and to increase the likelihood that they reach a voluntary
agreement.196 However, such a mechanism would also serve as a
second-order solution for cases in which the parties do not reach an
agreement. In order to minimize the damage to the personality interest
of the first inventor, the second inventor should be required to
demonstrate good faith efforts to secure the first inventor’s consent as a
condition for the activation of a liability rule.197 This way, the first
inventor would be able to enjoy direct recognition by the follow-on
inventor as the owner of the original patent. Beyond that, the existence
of an administrative or judicial proceeding to which the original inventor
is a party and in which she is recognized as the owner of the original
invention, alongside the fact that she is entitled to ongoing royalties for
the non-permitted use of her invention, may lessen the damage to her
personality interest.198
Ultimately, there does not appear to be significant harm to the
personality interest of the original inventor under the suggested regime.
Notably, it is only proposed that the rights of the original inventor be
curtailed in this narrow context of her relationship with other inventors,
while with respect to her relationship with any other third party, she
would continue to enjoy full property-like protection.
D.

Right of Attribution

Inasmuch as the original inventor has a personality interest in her
invention, the question arises whether the follow-on inventor should be
required to give her credit in connection with the follow-on invention.
A right of attribution exists under copyright law in many legal
systems.199 Various scholars have noted the link between the personality
justification and the right of attribution as well as other moral rights
granted to the author of a copyrighted work in certain legal systems.200

195. For a discussion of liability rule doctrines under economic theory, see supra note 60 and
accompanying text.
196. See Tur-Sinai, supra note 20, at 762-63.
197. Cf. id. at 763.
198. This is certainly the case in comparison with the alternative regime of exemption doctrine,
allowing free commercialization of follow-on inventions without any compensation to the original
inventor. For a discussion of such an alternative under the economic analysis, see supra note 59 and
accompanying text.
199. See, in the United States, 17 U.S.C. § 106A (2006).
200. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 168.
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In fact, under the patent laws of various countries, including the United
States, there is also a certain degree of protection on the right of an
inventor to be identified in connection with her invention.201 The
obligation to credit the inventor seems to correlate with the notion that
inventors have a personality interest in their inventions. Crediting the
inventor may strengthen her identification with the invention and
increase the chance that she enjoy the recognition of others in
connection with it.202 In the context of cumulative innovation, it seems
that obligating the follow-on inventor to credit the original inventor can
serve as another means to minimize the harm to the personality interest
of the original inventor that may be caused by allowing others to use her
invention for research and development purposes.203 This way, she
would at least be able to receive public recognition as a contributor to
the development of the follow-on invention.204
An important question arising in this context is whether credit
should be given to the private individual who developed the original
invention or to the owner of the patent when they differ, as in the case of
employee inventions205 or in other cases where the patent has been

201. See 35 U.S.C. § 111(a)(1) (2006) (mandating that a patent application shall be made, or
authorized to be made, by the inventor) and 35 U.S.C. § 115 (2006) (requiring the applicant to
“make oath that he believes himself to be the original and first inventor”). The patent must be
applied for by the inventor herself even if it is assigned immediately thereafter to her employer. See
Catherine L. Fisk, Credit Where It’s Due: The Law and Norms of Attribution, 95 GEO. L.J. 49, 57
(2006) (stating that “American patent law has always required the true and original inventor to be
identified in the patent application, even though patents are routinely issued to entities other than the
inventor based on a pre-invention assignment agreement”).
202. An interesting example, showing how valuable attribution may be to developers of
technological products, is the case of the open source software movement. See Fisk, supra note
201, at 88-89 (stating that open source software is “software for which the source code is freely
available to the public.”). While seeking to minimize intellectual property rights with respect to the
software in order to maintain a robust public domain, open source licenses still typically insist on
attribution. Fisk, supra note 201, at 89-91.
203. The fine details of the suggested attribution right, including the exact means by which
credit should be given, are yet to be conceived. Due consideration must be given, inter alia, to the
need to avoid overly burdening the follow-on inventor, especially in cases where her invention
relies on multiple previously patented inventions.
204. Inasmuch as the expected glory associated with being credited as someone who
contributed to the development of a follow-on invention plays a part in the initial motivation to
invent the original invention, such credit can be justified under the economic theory as well. See
generally, as to the role that anticipated fame and reputation may have in the formation of an
incentive to invent, supra note 22.
205. See generally Robert P. Merges, The Law and Economics of Employee Inventions, 13
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 5 (1999).
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assigned by the inventor to another person.206 As explained above, in
certain cases an owner by assignment of a patent may develop a
personality interest as a result of her identification with the invention
and her recognition by others as the owner of the rights in it.207
However, to the extent that the personality interest in inventions is
attributed to the fact that the personalities of inventors are embedded in
their inventions,208 it seems more appropriate to require that the credit be
given to the inventors themselves. It should be noted that when the
owner of the rights in the invention is a corporation, rather than a private
individual, the personality interest is irrelevant, as the personality theory
deals exclusively with interests of human beings.209 Assuming that most
owners by assignment of patents are corporate entities, this further
supports a rule whereby the credit is required to be given to the original
inventor herself and not to the patent owner, in the case of a split
between them.210
E.

Unique Scenarios

Two unique situations warrant a special discussion with respect to
the personality theory. The first occurs when an employee develops an

206. The currently existing attribution regime in patent law (see supra note 201) relates to the
right of the inventor vis-à-vis the owner of the patent (rather than any third parties) and thus,
naturally, awards the right to the inventor herself.
207. See text accompanying supra note 186.
208. See supra note 178 and accompanying text.
209. Cf. Cherensky, supra note 156, at 659-60 (pointing at the difficulties associated with a
comparison between the personhood interests of humans and corporations). Admittedly, as a
substantial share of research and development activities in modern day society takes place in the
research laboratories of universities, giant corporations or start-up companies, which end up owning
the patents for the resulting inventions, this could serve as a general argument against the
application of the personality theory to patent law. However, to the extent that the theory is used to
strengthen the rights of the individual inventor, as suggested herein with respect to the right of
attribution, such critical argument is irrelevant. Besides, even in the present, many inventions are
developed by so-called “garage inventors.” In fact, an increasingly common related phenomenon
nowadays is the practice of “user innovation.” Cf. Robert P. Merges, To Waive and Waive Not:
Property and Flexibility in the Digital Era, 23rd Annual Horace S. Manges Lecture, April 6, 2010,
34 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 113, 113 (2011) (noting that even in an era when creative works can
sometimes be made collectively, individual creative effort is still the crucial ingredient for many
high quality works). See generally Fisher, supra note 189; Katherine J. Strandburg, Users as
Innovators: Implications for Patent Doctrine, 79 U. COLO. L. REV. 467 (2008).
210. The concept of a split between ownership of economic rights and ownership of moral
rights with respect to an intellectual product is not new. In legal systems that grant moral rights
under copyright law, such rights are typically personal and they belong to the author even if she is
not the owner of the economic rights. See, in the United States, 17 U.S.C. § 106A(b) (stating that
“[o]nly the author of a work of visual art has the rights conferred by subsection (a) in that work,
whether or not the author is the copyright owner”).
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invention that is then owned by her employer.211 Such employee may
have a personality interest in the invention deriving from the fact that
she developed it. In order to preserve such interest and guarantee that
the employee can continue realizing her personality, develop her
identity, and receive recognition based on her relationship with the
invention, it seems that she should be granted permission to develop
follow-on inventions even after she has left her workplace without it
being considered an infringement of the original patent.212
The second unique scenario exists when the follow-on invention is
an improvement of the original invention.213 In general, the personality
theory does not seem to justify a right of the original inventor to use the
follow-on invention. The original inventor’s personality is reflected in
her own invention, which can be continued to be used by her even after
the development of a follow-on invention by another inventor. Yet, in
the improvement scenario, at least where the follow-on invention is a
perfect substitute for the original invention, which completely drives it
out of the market, the original inventor may no longer have an
opportunity to continue basing her business and commercial activities
upon her invention and may no longer be able to identify herself with it
and acquire recognition from others based on her relationship to it. The
damage to the personality interest of the original inventor in this
situation can be minimized by allowing the original inventor to use the
follow-on invention and, thus, continue identifying herself and enjoying
recognition by others with respect to such improved version of her
invention. Surely, if the original inventor gives her voluntary consent to
the commercialization of the improvement, she can demand a crosslicense to use it herself as part of such a deal. Yet, when the
commercialization of the improvement is allowed only under a liability
rule regime, such cross-license should be granted to the original inventor
as part of the administrative or judicial decision to activate the liability
rule.214 The grant of such cross-license should be taken into account in
setting the royalty rates payable to the original inventor in order to avoid

211. See generally, with respect to employee inventions, Merges, supra note 205.
212. Cf. Hughes, supra note 166, at 125; Cherensky, supra note 156, at 662-64 (suggesting a
“reverse shop-right”, allowing an employee to continue using an invention developed by her even
after she leaves her workplace).
213. See generally supra note 43 and accompanying text.
214. A provision mandating the grant of a cross-license to the original inventor as part of the
decision to grant a compulsory license to exploit a follow-on invention can be found in the TRIPS
Agreement, supra note 60, at art. 31(l)(ii). This provision is general in its application and not
limited to the improvements scenario.
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her over-compensation to the detriment of the follow-on inventor.215 As
the justification for such cross-license to the original inventor is rooted
in the personality theory, it should be non-assignable.
V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This Article calls for broader use of specific non-utilitarian
considerations in the design of patent law beyond the commonly used
economic theories. The discussion focuses on two well-known theories
used for the justification of property rights: the labor theory, which
maintains that every person has a right to the fruits of her labor, and the
personality theory, which focuses on the role that property fulfills in
allowing individuals to develop and realize their personalities. The
Article shows that these theories are applicable, to a great extent, to
rights in inventions, and thus, they should be taken into account by
policymakers in the patent arena.
While the labor theory and the personality theory have their own
shortcomings as analytical tools for the evaluation of legal rules, this
Article demonstrates that they can often provide significant insights with
respect to the optimal design of patent law. Such insights may, in
certain cases, be consistent with the ones arising out of the economic
analysis of patent law or may support one particular direction among
several possibilities pointed to by economic analysis.
Such
considerations could also potentially point policymakers in a direction
which is different or even contrary to the one suggested by economic
analysis. In such cases, policymakers would have to give priority to one
group of considerations—presumably, the economic considerations
traditionally governing the analysis of patent law—unless it is possible
to find a multi-layered solution that somehow accommodates all relevant
considerations.216 At times, the analysis in light of such non-utilitarian
theories may even expose new issues that do not arise under economic
analysis, yet warrant the attention of policymakers.
With respect to the specific test case examined in this Article—the
case of cumulative innovation—both the labor theory and the personality
theory support the adoption of a wide experimental use exception
215. One of the questions that needs to be thought of in connection with such arrangement is
whether such cross-license should be given automatically to the original inventor or only upon her
request, when her alternative is to give up such licenses in return for a higher monetary
compensation.
216. Cf. supra note 210 (describing an arrangement in copyright law allowing for a split
between the ownership of economic rights and moral rights with respect to the same intellectual
product).
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allowing free use of a patented invention in the development course of a
follow-on invention in a variety of circumstances, thus adding to the
force of certain economic considerations that point in this direction.217
Other conclusions arising out of the analysis under these theories are:
(1) the inventor of a follow-on invention should be entitled to register a
patent for it;218 (2) the original inventor should be entitled to a portion of
the profits in the market for the follow-on invention, and;219 (3) in case
the inventors fail to reach a voluntary agreement allowing the
commercialization of the follow-on invention, application of a liability
rule is warranted.220 The fairness considerations underlying the labor
theory guide policymakers to take into account, in calculating the
royalties payable to the original inventor under a liability rule regime,
the level of contribution of the original invention to the development of
the follow-on invention.221 Beyond that, the analysis under the
personality theory raises the important issue of attribution and supports a
rule requiring the follow-on inventor to give credit to the original
inventor in connection with the follow-on invention.222 Finally, the
analysis under the personality theory supports the enactment of special
rules, which would take into account the unique characteristics of two
specific situations:
the employee-inventor situation and the
improvements scenario.223
This Article, thus, demonstrates the potential usefulness of
integrating non-utilitarian considerations into the analysis of patent law.
According due weight to such considerations would enhance the ability
of scholars to recommend solutions to current policy problems. Beyond
that, it may ultimately result in a patent system that not only serves its
prescribed economic goals but also promotes other important goals such

217. See supra note 132 and accompanying text (under the labor theory); supra notes 188-90
and accompanying text (under the personality theory). See supra note 57 and accompanying text, as
to the indecisiveness of economic analysis with respect to this matter. See also Eisenberg, supra
note 10, at 1030 (pointing out that “[n]either the incentive to invent theory nor the incentive to
disclose theory offers any clear guidance in formulating a research exemption from infringement
liability”).
218. See supra notes 107-09 and accompanying text (under the labor theory); supra note 192
(under the personality theory).
219. See supra note 102 and accompanying text (under the labor theory); text accompanying
supra note 191 (under the personality theory).
220. See supra note 146 and accompanying text (under the labor theory); supra note 195 and
accompanying text (under the personality theory).
221. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
222. See supra notes 203-04 and accompanying text.
223. See supra notes 211-15 and accompanying text.
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as providing just reward for labor and enabling individuals to develop
their personality.
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